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Endogenously Proportional Bargaining Solutions

  • Ismail Saglam

    ()

    (TOBB University of Economics and Technology, Department of Economics)

This paper introduces a class of endogenously proportional bargaining solutions. These solutions are independent of the class of Directional solutions, which Chun and Thomson (1990a) proposed to generalize (exogenously) proportional solutions of Kalai (1977). Endogenously proportional solutions relative to individual i are characterized by weak Pareto optimality and continuity together with two new axioms that depend on the pairwise total payoff asymmetry of the bargaining problem with respect to each pair involving individual i. Each of these solutions satisfies the basic symmetry axiom and also a stronger axiom called total payoff symmetry.

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File URL: http://eaf.ku.edu.tr/sites/eaf.ku.edu.tr/files/erf_wp_1232.pdf
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Paper provided by Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum in its series Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers with number 1232.

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Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:koc:wpaper:1232
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  1. Chun, Youngsub & Thomson, William, 1990. "Bargaining with Uncertain Disagreement Points," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(4), pages 951-59, July.
  2. Roth, Alvin E, 1979. "Proportional Solutions to the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(3), pages 775-77, May.
  3. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
  4. Kalai, Ehud & Smorodinsky, Meir, 1975. "Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(3), pages 513-18, May.
  5. Jens Leth Hougaard & Mich Tvede, 2010. "n-Person Nonconvex Bargaining: Efficient Proportional Solution," Discussion Papers 10-21, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  6. Anbarci, Nejat & Bigelow, John P., 1994. "The area monotonic solution to the cooperative bargaining problem," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 133-142, October.
  7. Chun, Youngsub & Thomson, William, 1990. "Egalitarian solutions and uncertain disagreement points," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 29-33, May.
  8. Rubinstein, Ariel & Safra, Zvi & Thomson, William, 1992. "On the Interpretation of the Nash Bargaining Solution and Its Extension to Non-expected Utility Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 1171-86, September.
  9. Kalai, Ehud, 1977. "Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(7), pages 1623-30, October.
  10. Peters, Hans J M, 1986. "Simultaneity of Issues and Additivity in Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(1), pages 153-69, January.
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