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Truncated Leximin solutions

Listed author(s):
  • Driesen, Bram

This paper shows that three classic properties for bargaining solutions in an environment with a variable number of agents–Anonymity (AN), Individual Monotonicity (IM), and Consistency (CONS)–characterize a one-parameter family of Truncated Leximin solutions. Given a non-negative and possibly infinite α, an α-Truncated Leximin solution gives each agent the minimum of α and their Leximin solution payoff.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165489616300543
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Mathematical Social Sciences.

Volume (Year): 83 (2016)
Issue (Month): C ()
Pages: 79-87

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Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:83:y:2016:i:c:p:79-87
DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.07.003
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565

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  1. Thomson,William & Lensberg,Terje, 2006. "Axiomatic Theory of Bargaining with a Variable Number of Agents," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521027038, December.
  2. Kalai, Ehud & Smorodinsky, Meir, 1975. "Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(3), pages 513-518, May.
  3. Kalai, Ehud, 1977. "Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(7), pages 1623-1630, October.
  4. Mark A. Chen, 2000. "Individual monotonicity and the leximin solution," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 15(2), pages 353-365.
  5. Imai, Haruo, 1983. "Individual Monotonicity and Lexicographic Maxmin Solution," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(2), pages 389-401, March.
  6. Thomson, William, 1980. "Two characterizations of the Raiffa solution," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 225-231.
  7. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
  8. Hammond, Peter J, 1976. "Equity, Arrow's Conditions, and Rawls' Difference Principle," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 44(4), pages 793-804, July.
  9. Thomson, William, 1983. "Problems of fair division and the Egalitarian solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 211-226, December.
  10. Roth, Alvin E, 1979. "Proportional Solutions to the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(3), pages 775-777, May.
  11. Lensberg, T. & Thomson, W., 1988. "Characterizing The Nash Bargaining Solution Without Pareto-Optimality," RCER Working Papers 136, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  12. Li, Duozhe, 2007. "Bargaining with history-dependent preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 695-708, September.
  13. Lensberg, Terje, 1988. "Stability and the Nash solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 330-341, August.
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