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Truncated Leximin solutions

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  • Driesen, Bram

Abstract

This paper shows that three classic properties for bargaining solutions in an environment with a variable number of agents–Anonymity (AN), Individual Monotonicity (IM), and Consistency (CONS)–characterize a one-parameter family of Truncated Leximin solutions. Given a non-negative and possibly infinite α, an α-Truncated Leximin solution gives each agent the minimum of α and their Leximin solution payoff.

Suggested Citation

  • Driesen, Bram, 2016. "Truncated Leximin solutions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 79-87.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:83:y:2016:i:c:p:79-87
    DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.07.003
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Thomson,William & Lensberg,Terje, 2006. "Axiomatic Theory of Bargaining with a Variable Number of Agents," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521027038.
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    9. Thomson, William, 1983. "Problems of fair division and the Egalitarian solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 211-226, December.
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    11. Lensberg, T. & Thomson, W., 1988. "Characterizing The Nash Bargaining Solution Without Pareto-Optimality," RCER Working Papers 136, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
    12. Li, Duozhe, 2007. "Bargaining with history-dependent preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 695-708, September.
    13. Lensberg, Terje, 1988. "Stability and the Nash solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 330-341, August.
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