Proportional Concessions and the Leximin Solution
In this note we introduce a new axiom for bargaining solutions, named Proportional Concession Monotonicity (PCM), which imposes that no player benefits when all players collectively make proportional concessions with respect to their respective utopia values. We reconsider the leximin solution (Imai, 1983), and obtain an alternative characterization on the basis of PCM.
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|Date of creation:||2011|
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- repec:dgr:umamet:2009030 is not listed on IDEAS
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