Reference Functions and Balanced Concessions in Bargaining
In bargaining, agents expect their concessions to be reciprocated. Using the 'reference function' concept of W. Thomson (1981), this paper constructs a class of solutions the outcomes of which lead to balanced concessions by agents as prescribed by the reference function adopted. The Kalai/Smorodinsky (1975) solution arises as a special case. Another solution in this class, which depends on the entire feasible set, is generated by using the center of gravity as the reference function.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 28 (1995)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Canadian Economics Association Prof. Steven Ambler, Secretary-Treasurer c/o Olivier Lebert, CEA/CJE/CPP Office C.P. 35006, 1221 Fleury Est Montréal, Québec, Canada H2C 3K4|
Web page: http://economics.ca/cje/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:|| Web: http://economics.ca/en/membership.php Email: |