Nash Demand Game and the Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution
We introduce two new variations on the Nash demand game. One, like all known Nash-like demand games so far, has the Nash solution outcome as its equilibrium outcome. In the other, the range of solutions depends on an exogenous breakdown probability; surprisingly, the Kalai-Smorodinsky outcome proves to be the most robust equilibrium outcome. While the Kalai- Smorodinsky solution always finishes on top, there is no possible general ranking among the remaining solution concepts considered; in fact, the rest of the solution concepts take their turns at the bottom at various bargaining problems, depending on the specifics of the bargaining setup.
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