A Note on Implementation of Bargaining Solutions
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References listed on IDEAS
- Howard, J. V., 1992. "A social choice rule and its implementation in perfect equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 142-159, February.
- Kalai, Ehud & Smorodinsky, Meir, 1975. "Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(3), pages 513-518, May.
- Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
- Miyagawa, Eiichi, 2002. "Subgame-perfect implementation of bargaining solutions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 292-308, November.
- Moulin, H., 1984. "Implementing the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 32-45, June.
- Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, January.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Anbarci, Nejat & Boyd III, John H., 2011.
"Nash demand game and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 14-22, January.
- Anbarci, Nejat & Boyd III, John H., 2008. "Nash demand game and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution," Working Papers eco_2008_11, Deakin University, Department of Economics.
- repec:eee:matsoc:v:90:y:2017:i:c:p:100-110 is not listed on IDEAS
- Nicolò, Antonio & Velez, Rodrigo A., 2017. "Divide and compromise," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 100-110.
More about this item
Keywordsmechanism design; Nash program; complete information; C72; C78; D70; D74; D82;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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