An axiomatization of the Euclidean compromise solution
The utopia point of a multicriteria optimization problem is the vector that specifies for each criterion the most favourable among the feasible values. The Euclidean compromise solution in multicriteria optimization is a solution concept that assigns to a feasible set the alternative with minimal Euclidean distance to the utopia point. The purpose of this paper is to provide a characterization of the Euclidean compromise solution. Consistency plays a crucial role in our approach.
|Date of creation:||13 Oct 2008|
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