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Inequality averse collective choice

  • Ok, Efe A.

The Lorenz-Pareto Optimal Frontier of a collective choice problem indentifies a (usually quite large) subset of all Pareto optimal outcomes which are not inegalitarian according to the Lorenz criterion. We study the basic properties of Lorenz-Pareto optimal choice functions and in particular obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for rationalizability and representability of such functions.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.

Volume (Year): 30 (1998)
Issue (Month): 3 (October)
Pages: 301-321

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Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:30:y:1998:i:3:p:301-321
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco

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  1. Thomson, William, 1994. "Cooperative models of bargaining," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 35, pages 1237-1284 Elsevier.
  2. Yaari, Menahem E, 1977. "A Note on Separability and Quasiconcavity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(5), pages 1183-86, July.
  3. Blackorby, C. & Bossert, W. & Donaldson, D., 1993. "Generalized Ginis and Cooperative Bargaining Solution," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 93a12, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
  4. Ehud Kalai, 1977. "Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons," Discussion Papers 179, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  5. Lensberg, Terje, 1987. "Stability and Collective Rationality," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(4), pages 935-61, July.
  6. Bossert, Walter, 1994. "Rational choice and two-person bargaining solutions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(6), pages 549-563, November.
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  9. Elchanan Ben Porath & Itzhak Gilboa, 1991. "Linear Measures, the Gini Index and the Income-Equality Tradeoff," Discussion Papers 944, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  10. Blackorby, Charles & Bossert, Walter & Donaldson, David, 1996. "Consistency, Replication Invariance, and Generalized Gini Bargaining Solutions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 367-386, May.
  11. Ok, E.A. & Zhou, L., 1996. "Revealed Group Preferences on Non-Convex Choice Problems," Working Papers 96-39, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  12. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521343831 is not listed on IDEAS
  13. Peters, Hans J M, 1986. "Simultaneity of Issues and Additivity in Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(1), pages 153-69, January.
  14. Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1978. "On Revealed Preference Analysis," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(1), pages 121-31, February.
  15. Bossert, W., 1993. "The Kaldor Compensation Test and Rational Choice," Working Papers 9301, University of Waterloo, Department of Economics.
  16. Peters, Hans & Wakker, Peter, 1991. "Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Revealed Group Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(6), pages 1787-1801, November.
  17. P. L. Yu, 1973. "A Class of Solutions for Group Decision Problems," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 19(8), pages 936-946, April.
  18. Dutta, Bhaskar & Ray, Debraj, 1989. "A Concept of Egalitarianism under Participation Constraints," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 615-35, May.
  19. Dasgupta, Partha & Sen, Amartya & Starrett, David, 1973. "Notes on the measurement of inequality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 180-187, April.
  20. Kalai, Ehud & Smorodinsky, Meir, 1975. "Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(3), pages 513-18, May.
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  23. Peters Hans & Wakker Peter, 1994. "WARP Does Not Imply SARP for More Than Two Commodities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 152-160, February.
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