Generalized Ginis and Cooperative Bargaining Solution
This paper introduces and characterizes a new class of solutions to cooperative bargaining problems that can be rationalized by generalized Gini orderings defined on the agents' utility gains. Generalized Ginis are orderings that can be represented by quasi-concave, nondecreasing functions that are linear in rank-ordered subspaces of Euclidean space. In the case of three or more agents, the authors' characterization of (multivalued) generalized Gini bargaining solutions uses a linear invariance requirement in addition to some standard conditions. In the two-person case, the generalized Gini bargaining solutions can be characterized with a weakening of linear invariance. Copyright 1994 by The Econometric Society.
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