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Bargaining with history-dependent preferences

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  • Li, Duozhe

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  • Li, Duozhe, 2007. "Bargaining with history-dependent preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 695-708, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:136:y:2007:i:1:p:695-708
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Kahneman, Daniel & Tversky, Amos, 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 263-291, March.
    3. Compte, Olivier & Jehiel, Philippe, 2003. "Voluntary contributions to a joint project with asymmetric agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 112(2), pages 334-342, October.
    4. Anat R. Admati & Motty Perry, 1991. "Joint Projects without Commitment," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 58(2), pages 259-276.
    5. Spiegler, Ran, 2004. "Simplicity of beliefs and delay tactics in a concession game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 200-220, April.
    6. Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2004. "Gradualism in Bargaining and Contribution Games," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(4), pages 975-1000.
    7. Ran Spiegler, 2002. "Equilibrium in Justifiable Strategies: A Model of Reason-based Choice in Extensive-form Games," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(3), pages 691-706.
    8. Crawford, Vincent P, 1982. "A Theory of Disagreement in Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(3), pages 607-637, May.
    9. Fershtman Chaim & Seidmann Daniel J., 1993. "Deadline Effects and Inefficient Delay in Bargaining with Endogenous Commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 306-321, August.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Kyle Hyndman, 2011. "Repeated bargaining with reference-dependent preferences," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 40(3), pages 527-549, August.
    2. Topi Miettinen, 2010. "History-dependent Reciprocity in Alternating Offer Bargaining," Finnish Economic Papers, Finnish Economic Association, vol. 23(1), pages 1-15, Spring.
    3. Dutta, Rohan, 2012. "Bargaining with revoking costs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 144-153.
    4. Driesen, Bram, 2016. "Truncated Leximin solutions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 79-87.
    5. Driesen, Bram & Perea, Andrés & Peters, Hans, 2012. "Alternating offers bargaining with loss aversion," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 103-118.
    6. Kohler, Stefan, 2012. "Envy can promote more equal division in alternating-offer bargaining," MPRA Paper 40761, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Britz Volker, 2010. "Optimal Value Commitment in Bilateral Bargaining," Research Memorandum 056, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    8. Ettore Damiano & Hao Li & Wing Suen, 2008. "Delay in Strategic Information Aggregation," Working Papers tecipa-311, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    9. Britz, Volker, 2013. "Optimal value commitment in bilateral bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 345-351.
    10. Miettinen, Topi & Perea, Andrés, 2015. "Commitment in alternating offers bargaining," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 12-18.
    11. Britz Volker, 2010. "Optimal Value Commitment in Bilateral Bargaining," Research Memorandum 013, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    12. Breitmoser, Yves & Tan, Jonathan H.W., 2010. "Generosity in bargaining: Fair or fear?," MPRA Paper 27444, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch, 2015. "Time Preferences and Bargaining," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series /2015/568, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    14. Ellingsen, Tore & Miettinen, Topi, 2014. "Tough negotiations: Bilateral bargaining with durable commitments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 353-366.

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