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A Simple Axiomatization of the Egalitarian Solution

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  • Ismail Saglam

Abstract

In this paper, we present a simple axiomatization of then-person egalitarian solution. The single condition sufficient for characterization is a new axiom, calledsymmetric decomposabilitythat combines the axioms ofstep-by-step negotiations,symmetry, andweak Pareto optimalityused in an early characterization by Kalai [(1977) Proportional solutions to bargaining situations: Interpersonal utility comparisons,Econometrica45, 1623–1630].
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  • Ismail Saglam, 2012. "A Simple Axiomatization of the Egalitarian Solution," Working Papers 1201, TOBB University of Economics and Technology, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:tob:wpaper:1201
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Conley, John P. & Wilkie, Simon, 1991. "The bargaining problem without convexity : Extending the egalitarian and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 365-369, August.
    2. Kalai, Ehud, 1977. "Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(7), pages 1623-1630, October.
    3. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    4. Trockel, Walter, 2014. "Robustness of intermediate agreements for the discrete Raiffa solution," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 32-36.
    5. Thomson, William, 1983. "Problems of fair division and the Egalitarian solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 211-226, December.
    6. Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2011. "Disagreement point axioms and the egalitarian bargaining solution," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 40(1), pages 63-85, February.
    7. Roth, Alvin E, 1979. "Proportional Solutions to the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(3), pages 775-777, May.
    8. Myerson, Roger B, 1977. "Two-Person Bargaining Problems and Comparable Utility," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(7), pages 1631-1637, October.
    9. Thomson, William, 1984. "Monotonicity, stability and egalitarianism," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 15-28, August.
    10. Myerson, Roger B, 1981. "Utilitarianism, Egalitarianism, and the Timing Effect in Social Choice Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(4), pages 883-897, June.
    11. Chun, Youngsub & Thomson, William, 1990. "Egalitarian solutions and uncertain disagreement points," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 29-33, May.
    12. John Conley & Simon Wilkie, 2012. "The ordinal egalitarian bargaining solution for finite choice sets," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 38(1), pages 23-42, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:spr:decfin:v:40:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s10203-017-0203-y is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Ismail Saglam, 2017. "Iterated Kalai–Smorodinsky–Nash compromise," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer;Associazione per la Matematica, vol. 40(1), pages 335-349, November.
    3. Saglam, Ismail, 2016. "An Alternative Characterization for Iterated Kalai-Smorodinsky-Nash Compromise," MPRA Paper 73564, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
    • C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics

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