Two-Person Bargaining Problems and Comparable Utility
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- Myerson, Roger B, 1977. "Two-Person Bargaining Problems and Comparable Utility," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(7), pages 1631-1637, October.
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- Ismail Saglam, 2014.
"A Simple Axiomatization Of The Egalitarian Solution,"
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- Ismail Saglam, 2012. "A Simple Axiomatization of the Egalitarian Solution," Working Papers 1201, TOBB University of Economics and Technology, Department of Economics.
- Saglam, Ismail, 2012. "A simple axiomatization of the egalitarian solution," MPRA Paper 36773, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Miguel Ginés Vilar & Francisco Marhuenda Hurtado, 1998. "Welfarism in specific economic domain," Working Papers. Serie AD 1998-06, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
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- Radzvilas, Mantas, 2016. "Hypothetical Bargaining and the Equilibrium Selection Problem in Non-Cooperative Games," MPRA Paper 70248, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Kibris, Ozgur, 2004. "Egalitarianism in ordinal bargaining: the Shapley-Shubik rule," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 157-170, October.
- Roger B. Myerson, 1978. "Conference Structures and Fair Allocation Rules," Discussion Papers 363, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Eric van Damme, 1984. "The Nash Bargaining Solution is Optimal," Discussion Papers 597, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Zvi A. Livne, 1981. "An Extension of the Nash Bargaining Problem: Introducing Time-Related Bargaining Costs," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 550, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Marco-Gil, Maria del Carmen & Peris, Josep E. & Subiza, Begoña, 2012. "A Concessions-Based Mechanism for Meta-Bargaining Problems," QM&ET Working Papers 12-13, University of Alicante, D. Quantitative Methods and Economic Theory.
- Miguel Ángel Hinojosa & Amparo Mª Mármol & José Manuel Zarzuelo, 2007. "Multi-Utilitarian Bargaining Solutions," Working Papers 07.13, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics.
- Ehud Kalai, 1983. "Solutions to the Bargaining Problem," Discussion Papers 556, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Lajtos, Ildikó, 2010. "Verhandlungsverhalten und Anspruchsanpassung im internationalen Verhandlungsprozess: Die WTO-Agrarverhandlungen zum Abbau exportwettbewerbsfördernder Maßnahmen," Studies on the Agricultural and Food Sector in Transition Economies, Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Transition Economies (IAMO), volume 55, number 94723.
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