Solutions to the Bargaining Problem
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Kalai, Ehud, 1977.
"Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(7), pages 1623-1630, October.
- Ehud Kalai, 1977. "Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons," Discussion Papers 179, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Kannai, Yakar, 1977. "Concavifiability and constructions of concave utility functions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(1), pages 1-56, March.
- Roth, Alvin E & Rothblum, Uriel G, 1982. "Risk Aversion and Nash's Solution for Bargaining Games with Risky Outcomes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(3), pages 639-647, May.
- Kalai, Ehud & Smorodinsky, Meir, 1975. "Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(3), pages 513-518, May.
- Kihlstrom, Richard E. & Mirman, Leonard J., 1974. "Risk aversion with many commodities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 361-388, July.
- Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
- Thomson, William, 1983. "Problems of fair division and the Egalitarian solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 211-226, December.
- Yaari, Menahem E., 1969. "Some remarks on measures of risk aversion and on their uses," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 315-329, October.
- Myerson, Roger B, 1977.
"Two-Person Bargaining Problems and Comparable Utility,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(7), pages 1631-1637, October.
- Roger B. Myerson, 1976. "Two-Person Bargaining Problems and Comparable Utility," Discussion Papers 247, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- John C. Harsanyi, 1955. "Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63, pages 309-309.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- S. Nuray Akin & Murat R. Sertel, 2007. "The Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution Manipulated by Pre-Donations is Concessionary," Working Papers 0718, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
- Elaine Bennett, 1986. "Multilateral Bargaining Problems," UCLA Economics Working Papers 594, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Eric van Damme, 1984. "The Nash Bargaining Solution is Optimal," Discussion Papers 597, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Anna Aizer, 2007. "Wages, Violence and Health in the Household," NBER Working Papers 13494, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Marco Mariotii, 1996. "Fair bargains: distributive justice and Nash Bargaining Theory," Game Theory and Information 9611003, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 06 Dec 1996.
- Chaim Fershtman & Eitan Muller, 1983. "Capital Accumulation and the Sustainability of Collusive Markets," Discussion Papers 566, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
More about this item
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:556. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Fran Walker) The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask Fran Walker to update the entry or send us the correct email address. General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/cmnwuus.html .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.