Bargaining with an Agenda
Gradual bargaining is represented by an agenda: a family of increasing sets of joint utilities, parameterized by time. A solution for gradual bargaining specifies an agreement at each time. We axiomatize an ordinal solution, i.e., one that is covariant with order-preserving transformations of utility. It can be viewed as the limit of a step-by-step bargaining in which the agreement of the last negotiation becomes the disagreement point for the next. The stepwise agreements may follow the Nash solution, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution or many others.
|Date of creation:||Mar 2002|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Games and Economic Behavior, 2004, vol. 48, pp. 139-153.|
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