IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/pubeco/v65y1997i3p323-342.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Negotiations in multi-issue committees

Author

Listed:
  • Winter, Eyal

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Winter, Eyal, 1997. "Negotiations in multi-issue committees," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 323-342, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:65:y:1997:i:3:p:323-342
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047-2727(96)01627-1
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Moulin, H. & Peleg, B., 1982. "Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 115-145, June.
    3. Baron, David P. & Ferejohn, John A., 1989. "Bargaining in Legislatures," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(4), pages 1181-1206, December.
    4. Kalyan Chatterjee & Bhaskar Dutia & Debraj Ray & Kunal Sengupta, 2013. "A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market Selected Papers on Bilateral and Multilateral Bargaining, chapter 5, pages 97-111, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    5. Muthoo Abhinay, 1995. "Bargaining in a Long-Term Relationship with Endogenous Termination," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 590-598, August.
    6. Van Damme, Eric & Selten, Reinhard & Winter, Eyal, 1990. "Alternating bid bargaining with a smallest money unit," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 188-201, June.
    7. Fershtman, Chaim, 1990. "The importance of the agenda in bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 224-238, September.
    8. John Sutton, 1986. "Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 53(5), pages 709-724.
    9. Moldovanu Benny & Winter Eyal, 1995. "Order Independent Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 21-34, April.
    10. Winter Eyal, 1994. "Non-cooperative Bargaining in Natural Monopolies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 202-220, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. O'Neill, Barry & Samet, Dov & Wiener, Zvi & Winter, Eyal, 2004. "Bargaining with an agenda," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 139-153, July.
    2. Jeffrey S. Rosenthal & Martin J. Osborne & Matthew A. Turner, 2000. "Meetings with Costly Participation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 927-943, September.
    3. Xiao, Jun, 2018. "Bargaining orders in a multi-person bargaining game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 364-379.
    4. John, Reinhard & Raith, Matthias G., 2001. "Optimizing multi-stage negotiations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 155-173, June.
    5. Johannes Münster & Markus Reisinger, 2021. "Sequencing Bilateral Negotiations with Externalities," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 096, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    6. Akira Okada & Eyal Winter, 2002. "A Non-cooperative Axiomatization of the Core," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 53(1), pages 1-28, August.
    7. Femke Bekius & Sebastiaan Meijer & Hugo Thomassen, 2022. "A Real Case Application of Game Theoretical Concepts in a Complex Decision-Making Process: Case Study ERTMS," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 153-185, February.
    8. Fershtman, Chaim, 2000. "A Note on Multi-Issue Two-Sided Bargaining: Bilateral Procedures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 216-227, February.
    9. Elsasser, Peter, 2002. "Rules for participation and negotiation and their possible influence on the content of a National Forest Programme," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 291-300, December.
    10. Krasteva, Silvana & Yildirim, Huseyin, 2012. "On the role of confidentiality and deadlines in bilateral negotiations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 714-730.
    11. Daniel Cardona-Coll, 2000. "Multi-Issue Bargaining Under Budget-Constraints," Working Papers. Serie AD 2000-22, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    12. Fershtman, C., 1998. "A Note on Multi-Issue Two-Sided Bargaining : Bilateral Procedures," Discussion Paper 1998-58, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    13. Meir, Reshef & Kalai, Gil & Tennenholtz, Moshe, 2018. "Bidding games and efficient allocations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 166-193.
    14. Uyanik, Metin & Yengin, Duygu, 2023. "Expropriation power in private dealings: Quota rule in collective sales," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 548-580.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Harold Houba, 2022. "Costless delay in negotiations," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 74(1), pages 69-93, July.
    2. Akira Okada, 2015. "Cooperation and Institution in Games," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 66(1), pages 1-32, March.
    3. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 2015. "Coalition Formation," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    4. Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2010. "The Coalitional Nash Bargaining Solution," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(5), pages 1593-1623, September.
    5. Cho, Seok-ju & Duggan, John, 2009. "Bargaining foundations of the median voter theorem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 851-868, March.
    6. Yildirim, Huseyin, 2007. "Proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 167-196, September.
    7. Francis Bloch & Effrosyni Diamantoudi, 2011. "Noncooperative formation of coalitions in hedonic games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 40(2), pages 263-280, May.
    8. Caparrós, By Alejandro & Pereau, Jean-Christophe, 2021. "Inefficient coasean negotiations over emissions and transfers," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 189(C), pages 359-378.
    9. Tomohiko Kawamori, 2021. "Core equivalence in collective-choice bargaining under minimal assumptions," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 9(2), pages 259-267, October.
    10. Harstad, Bård, 2023. "Pledge-and-review bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
    11. Fershtman, Chaim, 2000. "A Note on Multi-Issue Two-Sided Bargaining: Bilateral Procedures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 216-227, February.
    12. Roberto Serrano, 2005. "Fifty years of the Nash program, 1953-2003," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 29(2), pages 219-258, May.
    13. Okada, Akira, 2010. "The Nash bargaining solution in general n-person cooperative games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(6), pages 2356-2379, November.
    14. Maria Montero, 2008. "Altruism, Spite and Competition in Bargaining Games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 65(2), pages 125-151, September.
    15. Christopher Tyson, 2010. "Dominance solvability of dynamic bargaining games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 43(3), pages 457-477, June.
    16. Marco Rogna, 2022. "The Burning Coalition Bargaining Model," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(3), pages 735-768, October.
    17. James M. Snyder Jr. & Michael M. Ting & Stephen Ansolabehere, 2005. "Legislative Bargaining under Weighted Voting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 981-1004, September.
    18. Harstad, Bård, 2021. "A Theory of Pledge-and-Review Bargaining," Memorandum 5/2022, Oslo University, Department of Economics, revised 21 Jun 2021.
    19. Gantner, Anita & Horn, Kristian & Kerschbamer, Rudolf, 2016. "Fair and efficient division through unanimity bargaining when claims are subjective," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 56-73.
    20. Norman, Peter, 2002. "Legislative Bargaining and Coalition Formation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(2), pages 322-353, February.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:65:y:1997:i:3:p:323-342. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.