Majority Rule in a Stochastic Model of Bargaining
In this paper we consider multilateral stochastic bargaining models with general agreement rules. For n-player games where in each period a player is randomly selected to allocate a stochastic level of surplus and q
|Date of creation:||2000|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: (212) 998-8936
Fax: (212) 995-3932
Web page: http://econ.as.nyu.edu/object/econ.cvstarr.html
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:|| Postal: C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10012|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Nicola Persico, .
"Consensus and the Accuracy of Signals: Optimal Committee Design with Endogenous Information,"
Penn CARESS Working Papers
45c846ad903decd7bf77b1c66, Penn Economics Department.
- Nicola Persico, . ""Consensus and the Accuracy of Signals: Optimal Committee Design with Endogenous Information''," CARESS Working Papres 99-08, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
- Merlo, Antonio & Wilson, Charles A, 1995. "A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(2), pages 371-99, March.
- Harrington, Joseph E, Jr, 1990. " The Role of Risk Preferences in Bargaining When Acceptance of a Proposal Requires Less than Unanimous Approval," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 135-54, June.
- Ariel Rubinstein, 2010.
"Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
252, David K. Levine.
- Diermeier, Daniel & Merlo, Antonio, 2004.
"An empirical investigation of coalitional bargaining procedures,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 783-797, March.
- Daniel Diermeier & Antoni Merlo, 1999. "An Empirical Investigation of Coalitional Bargaining Procedures," Discussion Papers 1267, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Chatterjee, Kalyan & Bhaskar Dutta & Debraj Ray & Kunal Sengupta, 1993. "A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(2), pages 463-77, April.
- Okada, Akira, 1996. "A Noncooperative Coalitional Bargaining Game with Random Proposers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 97-108, September.
- Merlo, A., 1992.
"Bargaining Over Governments in a Stochastic Environment,"
92-55, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Merlo, Antonio, 1997. "Bargaining over Governments in a Stochastic Environment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 101-31, February.
- Merlo, Antonio, 1996. "Bargaining over governments in a stochastic environment," Bulletins 7476, University of Minnesota, Economic Development Center.
- Baron David & Kalai Ehud, 1993. "The Simplest Equilibrium of a Majority-Rule Division Game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 290-301, December.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cvs:starer:00-05. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Anne Stubing)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.