Sitting on the fence: Pork - barrels and democratization under threat of conflict. The case of Ghana, 1996 - 2004
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- Pierre André & Sandrine Mesplé-Somps, 2013. "Sitting on the fence: Pork-barrels and democratization under threat of conflict. The case of Ghana, 1996 - 2004," THEMA Working Papers 2013-24, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
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More about this item
KeywordsPolitics; Ghana; Public goods; Elections;
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- O55 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Africa
- R53 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Public Facility Location Analysis; Public Investment and Capital Stock
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2018-01-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2018-01-08 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2018-01-08 (Positive Political Economics)
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