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Sitting on the fence: Pork - barrels and democratization under threat of conflict. The case of Ghana, 1996 - 2004

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Listed:
  • Pierre André

    (autre - Chercheur indépendant)

  • Sandrine Mesplé-Somps

    (LEDa - Université Paris Dauphine (Paris 9))

Abstract

This paper studies political competition in the case of a democratization process.We present an illustrative model describing political competition when the opposition threatens the stability of the country. In some cases, our model predicts the government should invest in opposition districts to avoid political agitation. This contrasts withexisting literature on established democracies, where public funds usually target ruling, party supporters or electorally tight districts.We empirically observe the first democratic changeover in Ghana in 2000. Implement-ing a diff-in-diff strategy, we find that districts with a leading political party memberappear to receive slightly more public funds when their party is not in charge. Thisphenomenon is found in urban areas and in areas that vote the most for this leadingmember’s party. Hence it occurs in places with the potential for political agitation.

Suggested Citation

  • Pierre André & Sandrine Mesplé-Somps, 2017. "Sitting on the fence: Pork - barrels and democratization under threat of conflict. The case of Ghana, 1996 - 2004," Working Papers hal-01619605, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01619605
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01619605
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Politics; Ghana; Public goods; Elections;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • O55 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Africa
    • R53 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Public Facility Location Analysis; Public Investment and Capital Stock

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