Power to which people? Explaining how electrification targets voters across party rotations in Ghana

In countries with low household electrification rates, who gets electricity is an urgent political question. I examine the location and timing of 3,515 electrification projects in democratic Ghana over two decades, during which time the party in power rotated twice while the fraction of the population with electricity doubled. I show that party rotations cause large shifts in the location of new electrification projects, with each party following a different canonical voter targeting strategy. I propose that the parties choose different strategies because electrification projects can influence not only the voters that receive a transfer, but also voters that merely learn about a transfer. I develop a theory of how such information externalities influence how parties target resources and I show that political elites in Ghana think about resource allocation in ways that are consistent with the existence of information externalities. This analysis thus demonstrates that politics can strongly condition who receives electricity and when they receive it.