The Distribution of Income in a Despotic Society
A distribution of income between rulers and subjects, or among ranks in a ruling hierarchy, cannot be derived from considerations of marginal products of owned factors of production. Such a distribution can be derived as a balance of income and violence. Society is organized in ranks, and the ruler provides occupants with incomes just sufficient that it is not in their interest to rebel. To model such behaviour, it is necessary to introduce phenomena normally excluded in economic analysis: combat, violence, mortality rates as a component of the utility function, and a rudimentary technology of control.
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- Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, 1974. "Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(1), pages 1-18, January.
- Brennan,Geoffrey & Buchanan,James M., 2006.
"The Power to Tax,"
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521027922, November.
- Brennan,Geoffrey & Buchanan,James M., 1980. "The Power to Tax," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521233293, December.
- Roemer, John E, 1985. "Rationalizing Revolutionary Ideology," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(1), pages 85-108, January.
- Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, 1979. "Bureaucrats Versus Voters: On the Political Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 93(4), pages 563-587. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)