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The Economics of Election Campaign Spending Limits

Author

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  • Filip Palda

    (Ecole nationale d'administration publique at Montreal)

Abstract

Spending limits are an important rule in the electoral game. Critics of limits claim that incumbents write these rules to keep down promising challengers. Their arguments are seductive but do not stand on a firm empirical base. The data seem quite eager to support or reject the critics' view, given the proper massaging. This paper suggests that if incumbents profit from spending limits, they will take their profit in a way that leaves no trace in the data. Profit does not come in the form of higher votes for the incumbent, but as richer government spoils for their close supporters. This explanation goes against the traditional view of how limits help incumbents. The explanation also helps to explain why there may never be a winner in the empirical debate on whether incumbents or challengers profit from limits.

Suggested Citation

  • Filip Palda, 2001. "The Economics of Election Campaign Spending Limits," Public Economics 0111011, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0111011
    Note: Type of Document - PDF; prepared on IBM PC ; to print on HP/PostScript; pages: 30; figures: included. PDF file may be viewed or printed
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bender, Bruce, 1988. "An Analysis of Congressional Voting on Legislation Limiting Congressional Campaign Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(5), pages 1005-1021, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. David Soberman & Loïc Sadoulet, 2007. "Campaign Spending Limits and Political Advertising," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 53(10), pages 1521-1532, October.
    2. Filip Palda, 2001. "Election Finance Regulation in Emerging Democracies: Lessons from Canada and the U.S," Public Economics 0111010, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Thomas Sexton & Herbert Lewis, 2012. "Measuring efficiency in the presence of head-to-head competition," Journal of Productivity Analysis, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 183-197, October.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • K39 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Other

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