Stable Sets in Three Agent Pillage Games
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- Simon MacKenzie & Manfred Kerber & Colin Rowat, 2015. "Pillage games with multiple stable sets," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(4), pages 993-1013, November.
- Manfred Kerber & Colin Rowat, 2012. "Sufficient Conditions for the Unique Stable Sets in Three Agent Pillage Games," Discussion Papers 12-11, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
- Manfred Kerber & Colin Rowat, 2011.
"A Ramsey bound on stable sets in Jordan pillage games,"
International Journal of Game Theory,
Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 40(3), pages 461-466, August.
- Manfred Kerber & Colin Rowat, 2009. "A Ramsey Bound on Stable Sets in Jordan Pillage Games," Discussion Papers 09-01r, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
- Rowat, Colin & Kerber, Manfred, 2014. "Sufficient conditions for unique stable sets in three agent pillage games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 69-80.
More about this item
Keywordspillage; cooperative game theory; core; stable sets; algorithm;
- C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- P14 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Property Rights
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-07-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2009-07-17 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2009-07-17 (Game Theory)
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