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Bargaining over an endogenous agenda

  • Anesi, Vincent

    ()

    (School of Economics, University of Nottingham)

  • Seidmann, Daniel J.

    ()

    (School of Economics, University of Nottingham)

We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is then implemented. Our main goal is to study the policies which can be implemented from any initial default in a pure strategy stationary Markov perfect equilibrium for an interesting class of environments including multi-dimensional and infinite policy spaces. It is convenient to start by characterizing the set of immovable policies: which are implemented, once reached as default. These policies form a weakly stable set; and conversely, any weakly stable set is supported by some equilibrium. Using these results, we show that minimum-winning coalitions may not form, and that a player who does not propose may nevertheless earn all of the surplus from agreement. We then consider how equilibrium outcomes change as we vary the order in which players propose, the identity of proposers, and the set of winning coalitions. First, if the policy space is well ordered then the committee implements the ideal policy of the last proposer in a subset of a weakly stable set; but this result does not generalize to other cases. We also show, surprisingly, that a player may prefer not to be given the opportunity to propose; and that the set of immovable policies may shrink as the quota increases. Finally, we derive conditions under which immovable policies in semi-Markovian equilibria form a consistent choice set.

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Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Theoretical Economics.

Volume (Year): 9 (2014)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages:

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Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:1318
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://econtheory.org

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  4. Kevin Roberts, 2005. "Condorcet Cycles? A Model of Intertemporal Voting," Economics Series Working Papers 236, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  5. Anesi, Vincent & Seidmann, Daniel J., 2014. "Bargaining over an endogenous agenda," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(2), May.
  6. Vincent Anesi & Daniel J Seidmann, 2012. "Bargaining in Standing Committees," Discussion Papers 2012-09, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
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  9. John Duggan & Tasos Kalandrakis, 2007. "Dynamic Legislative Policy Making," Wallis Working Papers WP45, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
  10. Anesi, Vincent, 2010. "Noncooperative foundations of stable sets in voting games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 488-493, November.
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  13. Tasos Kalandrakis, 2010. "Minimum winning coalitions and endogenous status quo," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 39(4), pages 617-643, October.
  14. Vincent Anesi, 2010. "A New Old Solution for Weak Tournaments," Discussion Papers 2010-04, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
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  19. Lucas, William F., 1992. "Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 17, pages 543-590 Elsevier.
  20. Diermeier, Daniel & Fong, Pohan, 2012. "Characterization of the von Neumann–Morgenstern stable set in a non-cooperative model of dynamic policy-making with a persistent agenda setter," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 349-353.
  21. Vincent Anesi, 2006. "Committees with Farsighted Voters: A New Interpretation of Stable Sets," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 595-610, December.
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  23. Hortala-Vallve, Rafael, 2011. "Generous Legislators? A Description of Vote Trading Agreements," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 6(2), pages 179-196, September.
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