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Committees with Farsighted Voters: A New Interpretation of Stable Sets

  • Vincent Anesi

    ()

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00355-006-0146-7
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

Volume (Year): 27 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 (December)
Pages: 595-610

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Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:27:y:2006:i:3:p:595-610
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  1. Schofield, Norman, 1978. "Instability of Simple Dynamic Games," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(3), pages 575-94, October.
  2. Hideo Konishi & Debraj Ray, 2000. "Coalition Formation as a Dynamic Process," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 478, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 15 Apr 2002.
  3. Chakravorti, Bhaskar, 1999. "Far-Sightedness and the Voting Paradox," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 216-226, February.
  4. Ray, Debraj, 1989. "Credible Coalitions and the Core," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 185-87.
  5. Cohen, Linda, 1979. "Cyclic sets in multidimensional voting models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 1-12, February.
  6. Le Breton, M. & Weber, S., 1991. "A Note on the Core and von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions of Simple Games," Papers 91-12, York (Canada) - Department of Economics.
  7. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1980. "Stability of decision systems under majority rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 150-159, October.
  8. Le Breton, M & Salles, M, 1990. "The Stability Set of Voting Games: Classification and Genericity Results," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 111-27.
  9. Martin, M., 1998. "Quota games and stability set of order d," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 145-151, May.
  10. Chwe Michael Suk-Young, 1994. "Farsighted Coalitional Stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 299-325, August.
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