A note on the non-emptiness of the stability set when individual preferences are weak orders
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- Martin, Mathieu & Merlin, Vincent, 2002.
"The stability set as a social choice correspondence,"
Mathematical Social Sciences,
Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 91-113, September.
- Mathieu Martin & Vincent Merlin, 2002. "The stability set as a social choice correspondence," Post-Print halshs-00069520, HAL.
- Martin, M., 1998. "Quota games and stability set of order d," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 145-151, May.
- Mathieu Martin, 2000. "A note on the non-emptiness of the stability set," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 559-565.
- Le Breton, M & Salles, M, 1990. "The Stability Set of Voting Games: Classification and Genericity Results," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 111-27.
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1980. "Stability of decision systems under majority rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 150-159, October.
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