A note on the non-emptiness of the stability set when individual preferences are weak orders
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References listed on IDEAS
- Mathieu Martin, 2000. "A note on the non-emptiness of the stability set," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 17(3), pages 559-565.
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1980. "Stability of decision systems under majority rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 150-159, October.
- Martin, Mathieu & Merlin, Vincent, 2002.
"The stability set as a social choice correspondence,"
Mathematical Social Sciences,
Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 91-113, September.
- Mathieu Martin & Vincent Merlin, 2002. "The stability set as a social choice correspondence," Post-Print halshs-00069520, HAL.
- Martin, M., 1998. "Quota games and stability set of order d," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 145-151, May.
- Le Breton, M & Salles, M, 1990. "The Stability Set of Voting Games: Classification and Genericity Results," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 19(2), pages 111-127.
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- Kumabe, Masahiro & Mihara, H. Reiju, 2011.
"Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: The core without majority dissatisfaction,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 187-201, May.
- Kumabe, Masahiro & Mihara, H. Reiju, 2008. "Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: The core without majority dissatisfaction," MPRA Paper 11728, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Diffo Lambo, Lawrence & Tchantcho, Bertrand & Moulen, Joël, 2009. "A core of voting games with improved foresight," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 214-225, September.
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