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Pareto efficiency in the dynamic one-dimensional bargaining model

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  • Tasos Kalandrakis

    (W. Allen Wallis Institute of Political Economy, 107 Harkness Hall, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627-0158)

Abstract

Pareto dominated agreements are shown to prevail with positive probability in an open set of status quo in a Markov perfect equilibrium of a one-dimensional dynamic bargaining game with endogeneous status-quo. This equilibrium is continuous, symmetric, with dynamic preerences that satisfy the single-plateau proerty. It is also shown that there does not exist a symmetric equilibrium with single-peaked preferences.

Suggested Citation

  • Tasos Kalandrakis, 2014. "Pareto efficiency in the dynamic one-dimensional bargaining model," Wallis Working Papers WP66, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
    • Handle: RePEc:roc:wallis:wp66
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Anesi, Vincent & Duggan, John, 2018. "Existence and indeterminacy of markovian equilibria in dynamic bargaining games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(2), May.
    2. Zapal, Jan, 2016. "Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining: Existence with three players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 235-242.
    3. David P Baron, 2018. "Elections and durable governments in parliamentary governments," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 30(1), pages 74-118, January.
    4. Bowen, T. Renee & Chen, Ying & Eraslan, Hülya & Zápal, Jan, 2017. "Efficiency of flexible budgetary institutions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 148-176.
    5. Zapal, Jan, 2020. "Simple Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    6. Vincent Anesi, 2018. "Dynamic Legislative Policy Making under Adverse Selection," Discussion Papers 2018-08, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    7. Nunnari, Salvatore & Zápal, Jan, 2017. "Dynamic Elections and Ideological Polarization," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 25(4), pages 505-534, October.
    8. Kazuo Yamaguchi, 2022. "Spatial bargaining in rectilinear facility location problem," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 93(1), pages 69-104, July.

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