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Minimum winning coalitions and endogenous status quo

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  • Tasos Kalandrakis

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00182-009-0202-5
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Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 39 (2010)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
Pages: 617-643

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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:39:y:2010:i:4:p:617-643
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/index.htm

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Keywords: Bargaining; Dictatorial agenda setting; Endogenous status quo; Proposal power; C73; C78; D72;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

  • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
  • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
  • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Battaglini, Marco & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2007. "The dynamics of distributive politics," Working Papers 1273, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  2. Tasos Kalandrakis, 2004. "Proposal Rights and Political Power," Wallis Working Papers WP38, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
  3. Battaglini, Marco & Coate, Stephen, 2005. "Inefficiency in Legislative Policy-Making: A Dynamic Analysis," Papers 08-09-2005, Princeton University, Research Program in Political Economy.
  4. Bowen, T. Renee & Zahran, Zaki, 2012. "On dynamic compromise," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 391-419.
  5. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 2001. "Markov Perfect Equilibrium: I. Observable Actions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 191-219, October.
  6. Pohan Fong, 2008. "Endogenous Limits on Proposal Power," Discussion Papers 1465, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  7. Armando Gomes & Philippe Jehiel, 2005. "Dynamic Processes of Social and Economic Interactions: On the Persistence of Inefficiencies," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(3), pages 626-667, June.
  8. Tasos Kalandrakis, 2007. "Majority Rule Dynamics with Endogenous Status Quo," Wallis Working Papers WP46, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
  9. Roger Lagunoff, 2004. "The Dynamic Reform of Political Institutions," Working Papers gueconwpa~04-04-07, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
  10. Banks, Jeffrey S. & Duggan, John, 1999. "A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice," Working Papers 1053, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  11. B. Douglas Bernheim & Antonio Rangel & Luis Rayo, 2006. "The Power of the Last Word in Legislative Policy Making," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(5), pages 1161-1190, 09.
  12. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
  13. Banks, Jeffrey S. & Duggan, John, 2006. "A General Bargaining Model of Legislative Policy-making," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 1(1), pages 49-85, January.
  14. Merlo, Antonio & Wilson, Charles A, 1995. "A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(2), pages 371-99, March.
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Cited by:

  1. Vincent Anesi & Daniel J Seidmann, 2012. "Bargaining over an Endogenous Agenda," Discussion Papers 2012-03, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  2. Bowen, T. Renee & Zahran, Zaki, 2009. "On Dynamic Compromise," Research Papers 2020, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  3. Baron, David P. & Bowen, T. Renee, 2013. "Dynamic Coalitions," Research Papers 2128, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  4. Seok-ju Cho, 2014. "Three-party competition in parliamentary democracy with proportional representation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 161(3), pages 407-426, December.
  5. Vincent Anesi & Daniel J Seidmann, 2012. "Bargaining in Standing Committees," Discussion Papers 2012-09, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  6. John Duggan, 2011. "Coalitional Bargaining Equilibria," Wallis Working Papers WP62, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
  7. Jan Zapal, 2014. "Simple Markovian Equilibria in Dynamic Spatial Legislative Bargaining," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp515, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague.
  8. Duggan, John & Kalandrakis, Tasos, 2012. "Dynamic legislative policy making," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1653-1688.
  9. Battaglini, Marco & Nunnari, Salvatore & Palfrey, Thomas, 2011. "Legislative bargaining and the dynamics of public investment," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2011-205, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).

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