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Stable Sets in multi-good pillage games are small


  • Alan F. Breardon
  • Colin Rowat


It is known that, in one-good pillage games, stable sets are finite. For m goods, it has been conjectured that the stable sets have measure zero. We introduce a class of sets, termed pseudo-indifference sets, which includes level sets of utility functions, quasi-indifference classes associated with a preference relation not given by a utility function, production possibility frontiers, and Pareto efficient sets. We establish the truth of the conjecture by proving that pseudo-indifference sets in Rp have p-dimensional measure zero. This implies that stable sets in n-agent, m-good pillage games have m(n - 1)-dimensional measure zero. We then prove that each pseudo-indifference set in Rp has Hausdorff dimension at most p - 1, a much stronger result than measure zero. Finally, we establish a stronger version of the conjecture: stable sets in n-agent, m-good pillage games have dimension at most m(n-1)-1.

Suggested Citation

  • Alan F. Breardon & Colin Rowat, 2010. "Stable Sets in multi-good pillage games are small," Discussion Papers 10-05, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
  • Handle: RePEc:bir:birmec:10-05

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    Cited by:

    1. Simon MacKenzie & Manfred Kerber & Colin Rowat, 2015. "Pillage games with multiple stable sets," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(4), pages 993-1013, November.
    2. Manfred Kerber & Colin Rowat, 2012. "Sufficient Conditions for the Unique Stable Sets in Three Agent Pillage Games," Discussion Papers 12-11, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.

    More about this item


    pillage games; cooperative game theory; stable sets; Hausdorff dimension;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
    • P14 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Property Rights

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