A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games
In this note we show that no solution to coalition formation games can satisfy a set of axioms that we propose as reasonable. Our result points out that “solutions” to the coalition formation cannot be interpreted as predictions of what would be “resting points” for a game in the way stable coalition structures are usually interpreted.
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- Barbera, Salvador & Gerber, Anke, 2003.
"On coalition formation: durable coalition structures,"
Mathematical Social Sciences,
Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 185-203, April.
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- Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Licun Xue, 2003.
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- Suryapratim Banerjee & Hideo Konishi & Tayfun Sonmez, 1999.
"Core in a Simple Coalition Formation Game,"
Boston College Working Papers in Economics
449, Boston College Department of Economics.
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