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A note on the impossibility of a satisfactory concept of stability for coalition formation games

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  • Barbera, Salvador
  • Gerber, Anke

Abstract

In this note we show that no solution to coalition formation games can satisfy a set of axioms that we propose as reasonable. Our result points out that "solutions" to the coalition formation cannot be interpreted as predictions of what would be ìresting pointsî for a game in the way stable coalition structures are usually interpreted.
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  • Barbera, Salvador & Gerber, Anke, 2007. "A note on the impossibility of a satisfactory concept of stability for coalition formation games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 95(1), pages 85-90, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:95:y:2007:i:1:p:85-90
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Barbera, Salvador & Gerber, Anke, 2003. "On coalition formation: durable coalition structures," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 185-203, April.
    2. Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Licun Xue, 2003. "Farsighted stability in hedonic games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 21(1), pages 39-61, August.
    3. Licun Xue, 1998. "Coalitional stability under perfect foresight," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 11(3), pages 603-627.
    4. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Jackson, Matthew O., 2002. "The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 201-230, February.
    5. Tayfun Sönmez & Suryapratim Banerjee & Hideo Konishi, 2001. "Core in a simple coalition formation game," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(1), pages 135-153.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Hans Gersbach & Hans Haller, 2011. "Bargaining cum voice," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 36(2), pages 199-225, February.
    2. Hannu Vartiainen, 2007. "Dynamic Farsighted Stability," Discussion Papers 22, Aboa Centre for Economics.
    3. Tania Singer & Ernst Fehr, 2005. "The Neuroeconomics of Mind Reading and Empathy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 340-345, May.
    4. Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez, 2009. "Strategy-proof coalition formation," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(3), pages 431-452, November.
    5. Hannu Vartiainen, 2008. "Dynamic stable set," Discussion Papers 33, Aboa Centre for Economics.
    6. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 2015. "Coalition Formation," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier.
    7. Eric Weese, 2015. "Political mergers as coalition formation: An analysis of the Heisei municipal amalgamations," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 6(2), pages 257-307, July.
    8. Vartiainen, Hannu, 2011. "Dynamic coalitional equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(2), pages 672-698, March.
    9. Debraj Ray & Rajiv Vohra, 2013. "Coalition Formation," Working Papers 2013-1, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    10. Hannu Vartiainen, 2008. "One-deviation principle in coalition formation," Discussion Papers 35, Aboa Centre for Economics.
    11. Armin Falk & Ernst Fehr & Christian Zehnder, "undated". "The Behavioral Effects of Minimum Wages," IEW - Working Papers 247, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    12. Eric Weese, 2011. "Political Mergers as Coalition Formation," Working Papers 997, Economic Growth Center, Yale University.
    13. Fehr, Ernst & Fischbacher, Urs & Kosfeld, Michael, 2005. "Neuroeconomic Foundation of Trust and Social Preferences," CEPR Discussion Papers 5127, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    14. Eric Weese, 2008. "Political Mergers as Coalition Formation: Evidence from Japanese Municipal Amalgamations," Global COE Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series gd08-017, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    15. Casajus, André, 2008. "On the stability of coalition structures," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 271-274, August.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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