Accounting for centralisation in the European Union : Niskanen, Monnet or Thatcher?
Centralisation at the level of the European Union takes the form, not so much of increased staff or budget, but of enlarged responsibilities and an increased share in regulation. The paper first reviews possible explanations of that trend that are based on a view of bureaucracy inspired by, or closely related, to William Niskanen's. It then turns to a discussion of the extent to which any characteristic of the EU machinery can develop without the acquiescence or agency of a majority of the member-state governments, and of the discussion of whether centralisation as a process is not simply a way to implement, in the manner suggested by Jean Monnet, the "ever closer union" that was - and, to a degree, still is - the underlying rationale for the European construction project. A third set of causes of centralisation can be found, it is claimed in the paper, in the objectives of setting a "level-playing field" and "completing the single market" that were adopted, with the backing of Margaret Thatcher, in the Single Act. It is argued that a policy which pursues the objectives of eliminating all kinds of fragmentation of the single market and of distortion of competition among firms implies, under modern conditions, a massive transfer of responsibilities in the area of regulation and policy-making from the level of the member states to that of the Union. Finally, the paper discusses the hierarchical relationship between these three sets of causes of centralisation.
|Date of creation:||Jun 2002|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Pôle d'Economie et de Gestion - 2, bd Gabriel - BP 26611 - F-21066 Dijon cedex - France|
Phone: 00 333 80 39 54 41
Fax: 00 333 80 39 54 43
Web page: http://www.leg.u-bourgogne.fr/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Howitt, Peter & Wintrobe, Ronald, 1995. "The political economy of inaction," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 329-353, March.
- Torsten Persson & Gerard Roland & Guido Tabellini, "undated". "The Theory of Fiscal Federalism: What Does it Mean for Europe?," Working Papers 101, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Timothy Besley & Paul Seabright, 1999. "The effects and policy implications of state aids to industry: an economic analysis," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 14(28), pages 13-53, 04.
- Jean-Michel Josselin & Alain Marciano, 2000. "Displacing your Principal. Two Historical Case Studies of Some Interest for the Constitutional Future of Europe," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 217-233, November.
- Wacziarg, Romain & Alesina, Alberto, 1999.
"Is Europe Going Too Far?,"
4553012, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Alesina, Alberto & Wacziarg, Romain, 1999. "Is Europe going too far?," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 1-42, December.
- Faure, Michael G, 2000. "Product Liability and Product Safety in Europe: Harmonization or Differentiation?," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(4), pages 467-508.
- Pierre Salmon, 2001.
"Thinking about something else: a rationality-compatible mechanism with macroscopic consequences,"
- Salmon, Pierre, 2001. "Thinking about Something Else: A Rationality-Compatible Mechanism with Macroscopic Consequences," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(2-3), pages 453-464.
- SALMON, Pierre, 1987.
"Decentralization as an incentive scheme,"
Institut des Mathématiques Economiques – Document de travail de l’I.M.E. (1974-1993)
98, Institut des Mathématiques Economiques. LATEC, Laboratoire d'Analyse et des Techniques EConomiques, CNRS, Université de Bourgogne.
- Oates, Wallace E., 2001. "Fiscal competition and European Union: contrasting perspectives," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(2-3), pages 133-145, April.
- Kirchgassner, Gebhard & Pommerehne, Werner W., 1996. "Tax harmonization and tax competition in the European Union: Lessons from Switzerland," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 351-371, June.
- Van den Bergh, Roger, 2000. "Towards an Institutional Legal Framework for Regulatory Competition in Europe," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(4), pages 435-466.
- SALMON, Pierre, 1993.
"Nations Conspiring against Themselves : an Interpretation of European Integration,"
LATEC - Document de travail - Economie (1991-2003)
1993-02, LATEC, Laboratoire d'Analyse et des Techniques EConomiques, CNRS UMR 5118, Université de Bourgogne.
- Pierre Salmon, 1995. "Nations conspiring against themselves: an interpretation of European integration," Post-Print hal-00445593, HAL.
- Moravcsik, Andrew, 1991. "Negotiating the Single European Act: national interests and conventional statecraft in the European Community," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 45(01), pages 19-56, December.
- Albert Breton & Pierre Salmon, 2001.
"External effects of domestic regulations: comparing internal and international barriers to trade,"
- Breton, Albert & Salmon, Pierre, 2001. "External effects of domestic regulations: comparing internal and international barriers to trade," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 135-155, June.
- Pierre Salmon, 2000.
"Vertical competition in a unitary state,"
- SALMON, Pierre, 1999. "Vertical competition in a unitary state," LATEC - Document de travail - Economie (1991-2003) 1999-11, LATEC, Laboratoire d'Analyse et des Techniques EConomiques, CNRS UMR 5118, Université de Bourgogne.
- Vaubel, Roland, 1994.
"The Political Economy of Centralization and the European Community,"
Springer, vol. 81(1-2), pages 151-190, October.
- Vaubel Roland, 1992. "The Political Economy Of Centralization And The European Community," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-38, March.
- Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 1998. "Subsidiarity and the European Union," NBER Working Papers 6556, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Mark A. Pollack, 2000. "The End of Creeping Competence? EU Policy-Making Since Maastricht," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(3), pages 519-538, 09.
- Wallace E. Oates, 1999. "An Essay on Fiscal Federalism," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(3), pages 1120-1149, September.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:lat:lateco:2002-05. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Odile Ferry)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.