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The End of Creeping Competence? EU Policy‐Making Since Maastricht

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  • Mark A. Pollack

Abstract

From its origins in the Treaty of Rome to the Maastricht Treaty on European Union, the EU has expanded the range of its activities dramatically, adopting both budgetary and regulatory policies across a broad range of issue‐areas. The 1990s, however, witnessed a political and economic backlash against the creeping centralization of policy‐making in Brussels, threatening a major retrenchment, or even devolution, of EU policy‐making. This article examines budgetary and regulatory data from the late 1990s and early 2000s, to determine whether the centralization of policy‐making has slowed, or even reversed, during the post‐Maastricht era. The data reveal selective evidence of retrenchment in EU budgetary expenditures, which have been limited by the fiscal restrictions of EMU, German resistance to any increase in its net contribution, and the new budgetary demands of enlargement. By contrast, data on EU regulation suggest that the EU has been, and remains, an active regulator across a wide range of issue‐areas after Maastricht, and will continue to play the role of a regulatory state in the future.

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  • Mark A. Pollack, 2000. "The End of Creeping Competence? EU Policy‐Making Since Maastricht," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(3), pages 519-538, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:38:y:2000:i:3:p:519-538
    DOI: 10.1111/1468-5965.00233
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    Cited by:

    1. David Benson & Andrew Jordan, 2014. "Explaining Task Allocation in the EU: ‘Retooling’ Federalism for Comparative Analysis," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(4), pages 794-809, July.
    2. Alberto Alesina & Ignazio Angeloni & Ludger Schuknecht, 2005. "What does the European Union do?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(3), pages 275-319, June.
    3. Carl Vikberg, 2020. "Explaining interest group access to the European Commission’s expert groups," European Union Politics, , vol. 21(2), pages 312-332, June.
    4. M. Huysmans, 2018. "Enlargement and Exit: : The Origins of Article 50," Working Papers 18-09, Utrecht School of Economics.
    5. Eric S. Nguyen, 2008. "Drivers and Brakemen," European Union Politics, , vol. 9(2), pages 269-293, June.
    6. SALMON, Pierre, 2002. "Accounting for centralisation in the European Union : Niskanen, Monnet or Thatcher?," LATEC - Document de travail - Economie (1991-2003) 2002-05, LATEC, Laboratoire d'Analyse et des Techniques EConomiques, CNRS UMR 5118, Université de Bourgogne.
    7. Nick Robinson, 2009. "The European Investment Bank: The EU's Neglected Institution," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47, pages 651-673, June.
    8. Nick Robinson, 2009. "The European Investment Bank: The EU's Neglected Institution," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(3), pages 651-673, June.
    9. Dupont, Claire & Primova, Radostina, 2011. "Combating complexity: the integration of EU climate and energy policies," European Integration online Papers (EIoP), European Community Studies Association Austria (ECSA-A), vol. 15, November.
    10. Martijn Huysmans, 2019. "Enlargement and exit: The origins of Article 50," European Union Politics, , vol. 20(2), pages 155-175, June.

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