Local Power to Tax and Devolution: An Empirical Assessment of the French Constitutional Reform
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Rose-Ackerman, Susan, 1981. "Does Federalism Matter? Political Choice in a Federal Republic," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(1), pages 152-165, February.
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KeywordsCentral government; Constitutional reform; France; Local public sector; Local taxation; National grants.;
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
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