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Leadership and conflict

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  • Hamlin, Alan
  • Jennings, Colin

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  • Hamlin, Alan & Jennings, Colin, 2007. "Leadership and conflict," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 49-68, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:64:y:2007:i:1:p:49-68
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    34. Alan Hamlin & Colin Jennings, 2004. "Group Formation and Political Conflict: Instrumental and Expressive Approaches," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 118(3_4), pages 413-435, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Stefan Brandauer & Florian Englmaier, 2009. "A model of strategic delegation in contests between groups," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 13(3), pages 205-232, September.
    2. Colin Jennings, 2012. "Rationalising ‘'Irrational'' Support for Political Violence," Working Papers 1212, University of Strathclyde Business School, Department of Economics.
    3. C. Jennings & H.J. Roelfsema, 2004. "Conspicuous Public Goods and Leadership Selection," Working Papers 04-10, Utrecht School of Economics.
    4. Colin Jennings & Hein Roelfsema, 2008. "Civil Conflict, Federalism and Strategic Delegation of Leadership," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 45(4), pages 557-573, July.
    5. Colin Jennings, 2011. "Intra-Group Competition And Inter-Group Conflict: An Application To Northern Ireland," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(1), pages 63-83.
    6. Hamlin, Alan & Jennings, Colin, 2011. "Expressive Political Behaviour: Foundations, Scope and Implications," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 41(3), pages 645-670, July.
    7. Colin Jennings & Hein Roelfsema, 2008. "Civil Conflict, Federalism and Strategic Delegation of Leadership," Working Papers 08-03, University of Strathclyde Business School, Department of Economics.
    8. Arye L. Hillman, 2021. "Harming a favored side: an anomaly with supreme values and good intentions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 186(3), pages 275-285, March.
    9. Tridimas, George, 2011. "The political economy of power-sharing," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 328-342, June.
    10. Jennings, Colin, 2012. "Rationalising ‘Irrational’ Support for Political Violence," SIRE Discussion Papers 2012-87, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).

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