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Rationalising ‘Irrational’ Support for Political Violence

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  • Jennings, Colin

Abstract

This paper provides a rationale for group support for political violence when violence does not provide a material benefi t. A theory of fairness is adopted to demonstrate that although group violence may not be the equilibrium of a material game it may be a fairness equilibrium in a game containing psychological payoffs. For this to happen the material stakes must be perceived as low and psychological payoffs are expressive. Although the material stakes are actually high, members of each group may choose expressively to support the use of violence because the probability of being decisive is low. The paper also considers the possibility of peace emerging as a fairness equilibrium. This can only happen if each group perceives the other as making some sacrifi ce in choosing peace.

Suggested Citation

  • Jennings, Colin, 2012. "Rationalising ‘Irrational’ Support for Political Violence," SIRE Discussion Papers 2012-87, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
    • Handle: RePEc:edn:sirdps:422
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10943/422
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Alexander Libman, 2015. "Words or deeds: what matters? On the role of symbolic action in political decentralization," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 49(3), pages 801-838, November.

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