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Security Transitions

Author

Listed:
  • Fetzer, Thiemo

    (Department of Economics, University of Warwick)

  • Eynde, Oliver Vanden

    (Paris School of Economics and CNRS)

  • Wright, Austin L.

    (Harris School of Public Policy, University of Chicago)

Abstract

How do foreign powers disengage from a conflict? We study the recent largescale security transition from international troops to local forces in the context of the ongoing civil conflict in Afghanistan. We construct a new dataset that combines information on this transition process with declassified conflict outcomes and previously unreleased quarterly survey data. Our empirical design leverages the staggered roll-out of the transition onset, together with a novel instrumental variables approach to estimate the impact of the two-phase security transition. We find that the initial security transfer to Afghan forces is marked by a significant, sharp and timely decline in insurgent violence. This effect reverses with the actual physical withdrawal of foreign troops. We argue that this pattern is consistent with a signaling model, in which the insurgents reduce violence strategically to facilitate the foreign military withdrawal. Our findings clarify the destabilizing consequences of withdrawal in one of the costliest conflicts in modern history and yield potentially actionable insights for designing future security transitions.

Suggested Citation

  • Fetzer, Thiemo & Eynde, Oliver Vanden & Wright, Austin L., 2018. "Security Transitions," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 383, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
  • Handle: RePEc:cge:wacage:383
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    Cited by:

    1. Eleonora Alabrese & Thiemo René Fetzer, 2018. "Who is NOT Voting for Brexit Anymore?," CESifo Working Paper Series 7389, CESifo.
    2. Julia Bok & Evens Salies, 2018. "Transformation numérique du secteur de l’énergie," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/60sgjahunh9, Sciences Po.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Counterinsurgency ; Civil Conflict ; Public Goods Provision JEL Classification: D72 ; D74 ; L23;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production

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