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Federalism with Bicameralism

  • Lisa Grazzini


    (DISEI, Università degli studi di Firenze)

  • Alessandro Petretto


    (DISEI, Università degli studi di Firenze)

We analyse horizontal and vertical fiscal externalities in a federal country with a bicameral national system. We show under which conditions, at equilibrium, the two chambers agree or disagree on the choice of a national tax rate.

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Paper provided by Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa in its series Working Papers - Economics with number wp2013_01.rdf.

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Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:frz:wpaper:wp2013_01.rdf
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  1. Michael J. Keen & Christos Kotsogiannis, 2002. "Does Federalism Lead to Excessively High Taxes?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(1), pages 363-370, March.
  2. Michael J. Keen & Christos Kotsogiannis, 2002. "Tax competition in federations and the welfare consequences of decentralization," Discussion Papers 0201, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
  3. Ben Lockwood, 2002. "Distributive Politics and the Costs of Centralization," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(2), pages 313-337.
  4. Tim Besley & Stephen Coate, . ""An Economic Model of Representative Democracy''," CARESS Working Papres 95-02, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
  5. Lisa Grazzini & Alessandro Petretto, 2007. "Voting on Devolution in a Federal Country with a Bicameral National System," Working Papers - Economics wp2007_09, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa.
  6. Sotiris Karkalakos & Christos Kotsogiannis, 2007. "A spatial analysis of provincial corporate income tax responses: evidence from Canada," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 40(3), pages 782-811, August.
  7. repec:bla:restud:v:59:y:1992:i:4:p:689-701 is not listed on IDEAS
  8. Roger B. Myerson & Daniel Diermeier, 1999. "Bicameralism and Its Consequences for the Internal Organization of Legislatures," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1182-1196, December.
  9. Paola Conconi & Giovanni Facchini & Maurizio Zanardi, 2012. "Fast-Track Authority and International Trade Negotiations," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/137521, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  10. Kotsogiannis, Christos & Makris, Miltiadis, 2002. "On production efficiency in federal systems," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 281-287, July.
  11. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1991. "The Politics of 1992: Fiscal Policy and European Integration," CEPR Discussion Papers 501, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  12. Christian Kelders & Marko Koethenbuerger, 2010. "Tax incentives in fiscal federalism: an integrated perspective," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 43(2), pages 683-703, May.
  13. Harstad, Bård, 2010. "Strategic delegation and voting rules," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(1-2), pages 102-113, February.
  14. Oliver Lorz & Gerald Willmann, 2004. "On the Endogenous Allocation of Decision Powers in Federal Structures," Kiel Working Papers 1209, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
  15. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 2003. "Centralized versus decentralized provision of local public goods: a political economy approach," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2611-2637, December.
  16. Martin J. Osborne & Al Slivinksi, 1995. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," Department of Economics Working Papers 1995-01, McMaster University.
  17. Sanjit Dhami & Ali al-Nowaihi, 2007. "Optimal Distribution Of Powers In A Federation: A Simple, Unified Framework," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(3), pages 197-229, 07.
  18. Michael Keen & Christos Kotsogiannis, 2003. "Leviathan and Capital Tax Competition in Federations," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 5(2), pages 177-199, 04.
  19. Dixit, Avinash & Londregan, John, 1998. "Fiscal federalism and redistributive politics," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 153-180, May.
  20. Chari, V V & Jones, Larry E & Marimon, Ramon, 1997. "The Economics of Split-Ticket Voting in Representative Democracies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(5), pages 957-76, December.
  21. Laurent Flochel & Thierry Madies, 2002. "Interjurisdictional Tax Competition in a Federal System of Overlapping Revenue Maximizing Governments," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 121-141, March.
  22. Lisa Grazzini & Alessandro Petretto, 2007. "Tax Competition between Unitary and Federal Countries," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 17-36, January.
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