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Federalism with Bicameralism

Author

Listed:
  • Lisa Grazzini

    () (DISEI, Università degli studi di Firenze)

  • Alessandro Petretto

    () (DISEI, Università degli studi di Firenze)

Abstract

We analyse horizontal and vertical fiscal externalities in a federal country with a bicameral national system. We show under which conditions, at equilibrium, the two chambers agree or disagree on the choice of a national tax rate.

Suggested Citation

  • Lisa Grazzini & Alessandro Petretto, 2013. "Federalism with Bicameralism," Working Papers - Economics wp2013_01.rdf, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa.
  • Handle: RePEc:frz:wpaper:wp2013_01.rdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Lisa Grazzini & Alessandro Petretto, 2017. "Spillover Effects in a Federal Country with Vertical Tax Externalities," Public Finance Review, , vol. 45(5), pages 701-720, September.
    2. Marco Alderighi & Christophe Feder, 2014. "Political competition, power allocation and welfare in unitary and federal systems," Working Paper series 23_14, Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Fiscal federalism; Median voter; Bicameralism.;

    JEL classification:

    • H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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