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Corporate Governance: What can we Learn from Public Governance?

  • Matthias Benz
  • Bruno S. Frey

In view of recent corporate scandals, it is argued that corporate governance can learn from public governance. Institutions devised to control and discipline the behavior of executives in the political sphere can give new insights into how to improve the governance of firms. Proposals in four specific areas are discussed: manager compensation, the division of power within firms, rules of succession in top positions, and institutionalized competition in core areas of the corporation.

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Paper provided by Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich in its series IEW - Working Papers with number 166.

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