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Corporate Governance: What can we Learn from Public Governance?

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  • Matthias Benz
  • Bruno S. Frey

Abstract

In view of recent corporate scandals, it is argued that corporate governance can learn from public governance. Institutions devised to control and discipline the behavior of executives in the political sphere can give new insights into how to improve the governance of firms. Proposals in four specific areas are discussed: manager compensation, the division of power within firms, rules of succession in top positions, and institutionalized competition in core areas of the corporation.

Suggested Citation

  • Matthias Benz & Bruno S. Frey, "undated". "Corporate Governance: What can we Learn from Public Governance?," IEW - Working Papers 166, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    • Handle: RePEc:zur:iewwpx:166
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    File URL: https://www.econ.uzh.ch/apps/workingpapers/wp/iewwp166A.pdf
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corporate governance; public governance; agency theory; intrinsic motivation; democracy; public administration;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

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