Corporate Governance: What can we Learn from Public Governance?
In view of recent corporate scandals, it is argued that corporate governance can learn from public governance. Institutions devised to control and discipline the behavior of executives in the political sphere can give new insights into how to improve the governance of firms. Proposals in four specific areas are discussed: manager compensation, the division of power within firms, rules of succession in top positions, and institutionalized competition in core areas of the corporation.
|Date of creation:|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: +41-1-634 21 37
Fax: +41-1-634 49 82
Web page: http://www.econ.uzh.ch/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Mark Schelker & Reiner Eichenberger, 2003. "Starke Rechnungsprüfungskommissionen: Wichtiger als direkte Demokratie und Föderalismus? Ein erster Blick auf die Daten," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 139(III), pages 351-373, September.
- Robert Tollison, 2012. "The economic theory of rent seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(1), pages 73-82, July.
- Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 2002. "Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262661314, June.
- Mueller, Dennis C., 1978. "Voting by veto," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 57-75, August.
- Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135.
- Catherine M. Daily & Dan R. Dalton, 1997. "Separate, But Not Independent: Board Leadership Structure in Large Corporations," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(3), pages 126-136, 07.
- Jack Fiorito & John T. Delaney & Paul Jarley, 1995. "National union effectiveness in organizing: Measures and influences," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 48(4), pages 613-635, July.
- Di Tella, Rafael & Schargrodsky, Ernesto, 2003. "The Role of Wages and Auditing during a Crackdown on Corruption in the City of Buenos Aires," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 46(1), pages 269-92, April.
- Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, 2003.
"Elected Versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence,"
Journal of the European Economic Association,
MIT Press, vol. 1(5), pages 1176-1206, 09.
- Stephen Coate & Timothy Besley, 2000. "Elected versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 7579, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Besley, Timothy J. & Coate, Stephen, 2000. "Elected Versus Appointed Regulators: Theory And Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 2381, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Alessandra Casella, 2002.
0102-71, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
- Reiner Eichenberger & Mark Schelker, 2007. "Independent and competing agencies: An effective way to control government," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 130(1), pages 79-98, January.
- Roberts, John & Van den Steen, Eric, 2000. "Shareholder Interests, Human Capital Investment and Corporate Governance," Research Papers 1631, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Addison, John T. & Schnabel, Claus & Wagner, Joachim, 2003.
"The Course of Research into the Economic Consequences of German Works Councils,"
IZA Discussion Papers
878, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- John T. Addison & Claus Schnabel & Joachim Wagner, 2004. "The Course of Research into the Economic Consequences of German Works Councils," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 42(2), pages 255-281, 06.
- Addison, John T. & Schnabel, Claus & Wagner, Joachim, 2003. "The course of research into the economic consequences of German works councils," Discussion Papers 22, Friedrich-Alexander-University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Chair of Labour and Regional Economics.
- Frey, Bruno S, 1997. "A Constitution for Knaves Crowds Out Civic Virtues," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(443), pages 1043-53, July.
- Bruno S. Frey & Margit Osterloh, .
"Yes, Managers Should be Paid Like Bureaucrats,"
IEW - Working Papers
187, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Bruno S. Frey & Margit Osterloh, 2004. "Yes, Managers Should Be Paid Like Bureaucrats," CREMA Working Paper Series 2005-03, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
- Bruno S. Frey & Margit Osterloh, 2005. "Yes, Managers Should Be Paid Like Bureaucrats," CESifo Working Paper Series 1379, CESifo Group Munich.
- Frey, Bruno S & Schneider, Friedrich, 1978. "An Empirical Study of Politico-Economic Interaction in the United States," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 60(2), pages 174-83, May.
- Tirole, J., 1993.
"The Internal Organization of Government,"
93-11, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Humphry Hung, 1998. "A typology of the theories of the roles of governing boards," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(2), pages 101-111, 04.
- Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March.
- Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zur:iewwpx:166. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Marita Kieser)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.