Starke Rechnungsprüfungskommissionen: Wichtiger als direkte Demokratie und Föderalismus? Ein erster Blick auf die Daten
Politico-economic analyses of democratic governance neglect the influence of independent audit institutions. While it is almost impossible to investigate their effect in a crosscountry design, we focus at the Swiss local level where audit courts play an important role. We collect cross-cantonal data on the strength of audit courts and econometrically analyze their impact on political outcomes, in particular on the tax burden and government spending. The results are astonishing: Powerful audit courts systematically lead to lower tax burden and government spending. The size of the effect is large especially if compared to other institutions such as referenda and local autonomy.
Volume (Year): 139 (2003)
Issue (Month): III (September)
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