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Mark Schelker

Personal Details

First Name:Mark
Middle Name:
Last Name:Schelker
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:psc231
http://www.schelker.net
Terminal Degree:2007 Department of Economics; Harvard University (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

(93%) Departement d'Économie Politique
Faculté des sciences économiques et sociales - Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät
Université de Fribourg - Universität Freiburg

Fribourg/Freiburg, Switzerland
http://www.unifr.ch/ecopol/

: +41 26 300 82 66
+41 26 300 96 78
Bd de Pérolles 90, CH-1700 Fribourg
RePEc:edi:cfpfrch (more details at EDIRC)

(5%) Swiss Institute for International Economics and Applied Economics Research
School of Economics and Political Science
Universität St. Gallen

Sankt Gallen, Switzerland
http://www.siaw.unisg.ch/

: +41/71/224 23 50
+41/71/224 22 98
Bodanstrasse 8, CH-9000 St.Gallen
RePEc:edi:siasrch (more details at EDIRC)

(1%) CESifo

München, Germany
http://www.cesifo-group.de/

: +49 (89) 9224-0
+49 (89) 985369
Poschingerstrasse 5, 81679 Munich
RePEc:edi:cesifde (more details at EDIRC)

(1%) Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA)

Basel/Zürich, Switzerland
http://www.crema-research.ch/

:

Gellerstrasse 24, 4052 Basel
RePEc:edi:cremach (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Mark Schelker, 2016. "Unabhängige Finanzkontrolle in der Demokratie," CREMA Working Paper Series 2016-06, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
  2. Eva Deuchert & Martin Huber & Mark Schelker, 2016. "Direct and Indirect Effects Based on Difference-in-Differences with an Application to Political Preferences Following the Vietnam Draft Lottery," CESifo Working Paper Series 6000, CESifo Group Munich.
  3. Simon Luechinger & Mark Schelker, 2015. "Regulation in Swiss Cantons: Data for one Century," CESifo Working Paper Series 5663, CESifo Group Munich.
  4. Mark Schelker & Marco Schneiter, 2015. "The Elasticity of Voter Turnout: Investing 85 Cents per Voter to Increase Voter Turnout by 4 Percent," CESifo Working Paper Series 5617, CESifo Group Munich.
  5. Schelker, Mark, 2011. "Lame Ducks and Divided Government: How Voters Control the Unaccountable," Economics Working Paper Series 1130, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science, revised Mar 2012.
  6. Mark Schelker, 2009. "Auditor Expertise: Evidence from the Public Sector," CREMA Working Paper Series 2009-20, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
  7. Mark Schelker, 2009. "Auditor Terms and Term Limits in the Public Sector: Evidence from the US States," CREMA Working Paper Series 2009-19, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
  8. Mark Schelker, 2008. "Public Auditors: Empirical Evidence from the US States," CREMA Working Paper Series 2008-04, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
  9. Mark Schelker, 2008. "Auditors and Corporate Governance: Evidence from the Public Sector," CREMA Working Paper Series 2008-05, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
  10. Mark Schelker & Reiner Eichenberger, 2008. "Rethinking Public Auditing Institutions: Empirical Evidence from Swiss Municipalities," CREMA Working Paper Series 2008-06, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).

Articles

  1. Simon Luechinger & Mark Schelker & Alois Stutzer, 2014. "Governance, bureaucratic rents, and well-being differentials across US states," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(2), pages 443-464.
  2. Mark Schelker, 2013. "Auditors and Corporate Governance: Evidence from the Public Sector," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(2), pages 275-300, May.
  3. Schelker, Mark, 2012. "Auditor expertise: Evidence from the public sector," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(3), pages 432-435.
  4. Mark Schelker, 2012. "The influence of auditor term length and term limits on US state general obligation bond ratings," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 27-49, January.
  5. Gebhard Kirchgässner & Mark Schelker, 2011. "Federalism and exit costs," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 191-197, June.
  6. Schelker, Mark & Eichenberger, Reiner, 2010. "Auditors and fiscal policy: Empirical evidence on a little big institution," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(4), pages 357-380, December.
  7. Reiner Eichenberger & Mark Schelker, 2007. "Independent and competing agencies: An effective way to control government," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 130(1), pages 79-98, January.
  8. Mark Schelker & Reiner Eichenberger, 2003. "Starke Rechnungsprüfungskommissionen: Wichtiger als direkte Demokratie und Föderalismus? Ein erster Blick auf die Daten," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 139(III), pages 351-373, September.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Eva Deuchert & Martin Huber & Mark Schelker, 2016. "Direct and Indirect Effects Based on Difference-in-Differences with an Application to Political Preferences Following the Vietnam Draft Lottery," CESifo Working Paper Series 6000, CESifo Group Munich.

    Cited by:

    1. Bhalotra, S.; & Karlsson, M.; & Nilsson, T.; & Schwarz, N.;, 2018. "Infant Health, Cognitive Performance and Earnings: Evidence from Inception of the Welfare State in Sweden," Health, Econometrics and Data Group (HEDG) Working Papers 18/06, HEDG, c/o Department of Economics, University of York.

  2. Mark Schelker & Marco Schneiter, 2015. "The Elasticity of Voter Turnout: Investing 85 Cents per Voter to Increase Voter Turnout by 4 Percent," CESifo Working Paper Series 5617, CESifo Group Munich.

    Cited by:

    1. Gäbler, Stefanie & Potrafke, Niklas & Rösel, Felix, 2017. "Compulsory Voting, Voter Turnout and Asymmetrical Habit-formation," Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168074, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

  3. Schelker, Mark, 2011. "Lame Ducks and Divided Government: How Voters Control the Unaccountable," Economics Working Paper Series 1130, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science, revised Mar 2012.

    Cited by:

    1. Geys, Benny & Vermeir, Jan, 2012. "Party cues in elections under multilevel governance: Theory and evidence from US states," Discussion Papers, Research Professorship & Project "The Future of Fiscal Federalism" SP II 2012-107, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
    2. Bernecker, Andreas, 2016. "Divided we reform? Evidence from US welfare policies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 24-38.
    3. Andreas Bernecker, 2014. "Divided We Reform? Evidence from US Welfare Policies," CESifo Working Paper Series 4564, CESifo Group Munich.

  4. Mark Schelker, 2009. "Auditor Expertise: Evidence from the Public Sector," CREMA Working Paper Series 2009-20, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).

    Cited by:

    1. Mark Schelker, 2016. "Unabhängige Finanzkontrolle in der Demokratie," CREMA Working Paper Series 2016-06, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
    2. Niccolò Persiani & Alberto Romolini & Claudia Galanti, 2015. "Il nuovo sistema di controlli di regolarità amministrativa e contabile nel Servizio Sanitario Italiano: i Percorsi Attuativi della Certificabilità," MECOSAN. Menagement e economia sanitaria, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2015(94), pages 31-50.
    3. John A. Dove & Courtney A. Collins & Daniel J. Smith, 2018. "The impact of public pension board of trustee composition on state bond ratings," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 51-73, February.

  5. Mark Schelker, 2009. "Auditor Terms and Term Limits in the Public Sector: Evidence from the US States," CREMA Working Paper Series 2009-19, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).

    Cited by:

    1. Mark Schelker, 2012. "The influence of auditor term length and term limits on US state general obligation bond ratings," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 27-49, January.

  6. Mark Schelker, 2008. "Public Auditors: Empirical Evidence from the US States," CREMA Working Paper Series 2008-04, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).

    Cited by:

    1. Blume, Lorenz & Voigt, Stefan, 2011. "Does organizational design of supreme audit institutions matter? A cross-country assessment," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 215-229, June.

  7. Mark Schelker, 2008. "Auditors and Corporate Governance: Evidence from the Public Sector," CREMA Working Paper Series 2008-05, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).

    Cited by:

    1. Mark Schelker, 2016. "Unabhängige Finanzkontrolle in der Demokratie," CREMA Working Paper Series 2016-06, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).

  8. Mark Schelker & Reiner Eichenberger, 2008. "Rethinking Public Auditing Institutions: Empirical Evidence from Swiss Municipalities," CREMA Working Paper Series 2008-06, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).

    Cited by:

    1. Schelker, Mark & Eichenberger, Reiner, 2010. "Auditors and fiscal policy: Empirical evidence on a little big institution," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(4), pages 357-380, December.

Articles

  1. Simon Luechinger & Mark Schelker & Alois Stutzer, 2014. "Governance, bureaucratic rents, and well-being differentials across US states," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(2), pages 443-464.

    Cited by:

    1. Sequeira, Tiago & Minas, Tiago & Ferreira-Lopes, Alexandra, 2014. "Do Large Governments Decrease Happiness?," MPRA Paper 54418, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Bruno Frey & Alois Stutzer, 2017. "Public Choice and Happiness," CREMA Working Paper Series 2017-03, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
    3. Mark Schelker, 2016. "Unabhängige Finanzkontrolle in der Demokratie," CREMA Working Paper Series 2016-06, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
    4. Björn Kauder & Manuela Krause & Niklas Potrafke, 2016. "Electoral Cycles in MPs' Salaries: Evidence from the German States," CESifo Working Paper Series 6028, CESifo Group Munich.
    5. Lin, Yi-Chen & Hwang, Ruey-Ching & Deng, Wen-Shuenn, 2015. "Heterogeneity in the relationship between subjective well-being and its determinants over the life cycle: A varying-coefficient ordered probit approach," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 372-386.

  2. Mark Schelker, 2013. "Auditors and Corporate Governance: Evidence from the Public Sector," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(2), pages 275-300, May.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. Schelker, Mark, 2012. "Auditor expertise: Evidence from the public sector," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(3), pages 432-435.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. Mark Schelker, 2012. "The influence of auditor term length and term limits on US state general obligation bond ratings," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 27-49, January.

    Cited by:

    1. Schelker, Mark, 2012. "Auditor expertise: Evidence from the public sector," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(3), pages 432-435.
    2. John A. Dove, 2017. "Judicial Independence and US State Bond Ratings: An Empirical Investigation," Public Budgeting & Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(3), pages 24-46, September.
    3. Mark Schelker, 2016. "Unabhängige Finanzkontrolle in der Demokratie," CREMA Working Paper Series 2016-06, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
    4. John A. Dove & Courtney A. Collins & Daniel J. Smith, 2018. "The impact of public pension board of trustee composition on state bond ratings," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 51-73, February.

  5. Schelker, Mark & Eichenberger, Reiner, 2010. "Auditors and fiscal policy: Empirical evidence on a little big institution," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(4), pages 357-380, December.

    Cited by:

    1. David Stadelmann & Reiner Eichenberger, 2014. "Public debts capitalize into property prices: empirical evidence for a new perspective on debt incidence," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 21(3), pages 498-529, June.
    2. Schelker, Mark, 2012. "Auditor expertise: Evidence from the public sector," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(3), pages 432-435.
    3. Mark Schelker, 2016. "Unabhängige Finanzkontrolle in der Demokratie," CREMA Working Paper Series 2016-06, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
    4. Funk, Patricia & Gathmann, Christina, 2013. "Voter preferences, direct democracy and government spending," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 300-319.

  6. Reiner Eichenberger & Mark Schelker, 2007. "Independent and competing agencies: An effective way to control government," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 130(1), pages 79-98, January.

    Cited by:

    1. Reiner Eichenberger & David Stadelmann, 2009. "Consequences of Debt Capitalization: Property Ownership and Debt/Tax Choice," CREMA Working Paper Series 2009-08, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
    2. Matthias Benz & Bruno S. Frey, "undated". "Corporate Governance: What can we Learn from Public Governance?," IEW - Working Papers 166, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    3. Lars Feld & Gebhard Kirchgässner & Christoph Schaltegger, 2011. "Municipal debt in Switzerland: new empirical results," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 149(1), pages 49-64, October.
    4. Bruno S. Frey, 2011. "Tullock Challenges: Happiness, Revolutions and Democracy," CREMA Working Paper Series 2011-12, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
    5. Baskaran, Thushyanthan, 2010. "On the Link Between Fiscal Decentralization and Public Debt in OECD Countries," MPRA Paper 21599, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Schelker, Mark, 2012. "Auditor expertise: Evidence from the public sector," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(3), pages 432-435.
    7. Eichenberger Reiner & Stadelmann David, 2010. "How Federalism Protects Future Generations from Today's Public Debts," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 6(3), pages 395-420, December.
    8. Schelker, Mark & Eichenberger, Reiner, 2010. "Auditors and fiscal policy: Empirical evidence on a little big institution," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(4), pages 357-380, December.
    9. Bruno Frey, 2008. "Outside and inside competition for international organizations—from analysis to innovations," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 3(4), pages 335-350, December.
    10. Benno Torgler & Christoph A. Schaltegger, 2005. "The Determinants of Political Discussion: How Important are Audit Courts and Local Autonomy?," CREMA Working Paper Series 2005-28, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
    11. David Stadelmann & Reiner Eichenberger, 2008. "Debt Capitalization: A New Perspective on Ricardian Equivalence," CREMA Working Paper Series 2008-30, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
    12. Mark Schelker, 2009. "Auditor Terms and Term Limits in the Public Sector: Evidence from the US States," CREMA Working Paper Series 2009-19, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
    13. Blume, Lorenz & Voigt, Stefan, 2011. "Does organizational design of supreme audit institutions matter? A cross-country assessment," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 215-229, June.
    14. Mark Schelker, 2012. "The influence of auditor term length and term limits on US state general obligation bond ratings," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 27-49, January.
    15. Lorenz Blume & Stefan Voigt, 2007. "Supreme Audit Institutions: Supremely Superfluous? A Cross Country Assessment," ICER Working Papers 03-2007, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.

  7. Mark Schelker & Reiner Eichenberger, 2003. "Starke Rechnungsprüfungskommissionen: Wichtiger als direkte Demokratie und Föderalismus? Ein erster Blick auf die Daten," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 139(III), pages 351-373, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Matthias Benz & Bruno S. Frey, "undated". "Corporate Governance: What can we Learn from Public Governance?," IEW - Working Papers 166, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    2. Benno Torgler, 2004. "A Knight Without a Sword or a Toothless Tiger? The Effects of Audit Courts on Tax Morale in Switzerland," CREMA Working Paper Series 2004-06, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
    3. Reiner Eichenberger & Mark Schelker, 2007. "Independent and competing agencies: An effective way to control government," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 130(1), pages 79-98, January.
    4. Schelker, Mark, 2012. "Auditor expertise: Evidence from the public sector," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(3), pages 432-435.
    5. Schelker, Mark & Eichenberger, Reiner, 2010. "Auditors and fiscal policy: Empirical evidence on a little big institution," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(4), pages 357-380, December.
    6. Kersten Kellermann, 2008. "„Kosten der Kleinheit” und die Föderalismusdebatte in der Schweiz," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 9(2), pages 196-225, May.
    7. Benno Torgler & Christoph A. Schaltegger, 2005. "The Determinants of Political Discussion: How Important are Audit Courts and Local Autonomy?," CREMA Working Paper Series 2005-28, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
    8. Mark Schelker, 2009. "Auditor Terms and Term Limits in the Public Sector: Evidence from the US States," CREMA Working Paper Series 2009-19, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
    9. Blume, Lorenz & Voigt, Stefan, 2011. "Does organizational design of supreme audit institutions matter? A cross-country assessment," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 215-229, June.
    10. Mark Schelker, 2012. "The influence of auditor term length and term limits on US state general obligation bond ratings," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 27-49, January.
    11. Lorenz Blume & Stefan Voigt, 2007. "Supreme Audit Institutions: Supremely Superfluous? A Cross Country Assessment," ICER Working Papers 03-2007, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 8 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-ACC: Accounting & Auditing (4) 2008-04-12 2008-04-12 2008-04-12 2009-10-03
  2. NEP-POL: Positive Political Economics (4) 2008-04-12 2008-04-12 2011-07-21 2016-08-14
  3. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (3) 2008-04-12 2008-04-12 2011-07-21
  4. NEP-PBE: Public Economics (3) 2008-04-12 2008-04-12 2009-10-03
  5. NEP-CIS: Confederation of Independent States (1) 2016-08-14
  6. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory & Applications (1) 2009-10-03
  7. NEP-GER: German Papers (1) 2016-08-14
  8. NEP-ORE: Operations Research (1) 2008-04-12
  9. NEP-SEA: South East Asia (1) 2016-08-14

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