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Auszeichnungen: Ein Vernachl�ssigter Anreiz

  • Bruno S. Frey
  • Susanne Neckermann

Laut �konomischer Standardtheorie sollen Arbeitsanreize mittels Geldzahlungen vermittelt werden. Materielle Anreize in nicht-monet�rer Form sind demgegen�ber weniger effizient, sind aber dennoch weit verbreitet. Auszeichnungen in Form von Titeln, Orden, Medaillen und Ehrungen (Preisen) wurden bisher nicht beachtet. Es handelt sich dabei um extrinsische, nicht-materielle Anreize die ihre Wirkung �ber den Urtrieb der Individuen nach sozialer Anerkennung und Status entfalten. Wir analysieren wie sich monet�re Anreize und Auszeichnungen unterscheiden: Auszeichnungen sind in der Regel billig, begr�nden soziale Beziehungen, sind nicht direkt mit der Leistung verkn�pft und verf�gen �ber eine Signalwirkung. Dar�ber hinaus unterst�tzen Auszeichnungen die intrinsische Motivation, k�nnen die Wohlfahrt erh�hen und sind steuerfrei. Auszeichnungen sind ein wichtiges zus�tzliches Instrument im Arsenal der Prinzipal-Agenten-Theorie. In vielen Kontexten wirken sie besser als Geld.

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Paper provided by Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich in its series IEW - Working Papers with number 254.

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Date of creation: Oct 2005
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Handle: RePEc:zur:iewwpx:254
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