Evaluitis ï¿½ Eine Neue Krankheit
ï¿½Evaluitisï¿½ - i.e. ex post assessments of organizations and persons - has become a rapidly spreading disease. In addition to the well-known costs imposed on evaluees and evaluators, additional significant costs are commonly disregarded: incentives are distorted, ossification is induced and the decision approach is wrongly conceived. As a result, evaluations are used too often and too intensively. A viable and often superior alternative to evaluations is a careful selection of persons and afterwards leaving them to pursue their assigned tasks.
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