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Evaluitis � Eine Neue Krankheit

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  • Bruno S. Frey

Abstract

�Evaluitis� - i.e. ex post assessments of organizations and persons - has become a rapidly spreading disease. In addition to the well-known costs imposed on evaluees and evaluators, additional significant costs are commonly disregarded: incentives are distorted, ossification is induced and the decision approach is wrongly conceived. As a result, evaluations are used too often and too intensively. A viable and often superior alternative to evaluations is a careful selection of persons and afterwards leaving them to pursue their assigned tasks.

Suggested Citation

  • Bruno S. Frey, 2006. "Evaluitis � Eine Neue Krankheit," IEW - Working Papers 293, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    • Handle: RePEc:zur:iewwpx:293
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Evaluation; Performance; Selection; Research; Incentives;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • H43 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Project Evaluation; Social Discount Rate
    • M40 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - General
    • M5 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics

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