Evaluierungen, Evaluierungen H Evaluitis
In the sciences the outside evaluation of past performances of universities, faculties, departments, research groups and of individuals has become more and more frequent, nearly incessant. It could be said that the sciences are afflicted with "Evaluitis", a creeping and widespread illness. Besides the obvious costs that arise for those being evaluated and for those doing the evaluation there are additional costs that weigh heavily but are usually disregarded: incentives are distorted systematically and ossification is promoted. Furthermore, the whole decision approach is wrongly conceived. For these reasons there are too many and too thorough evaluations. A useful alternative is an appropriate design of institutions guiding incentives and a careful selection of persons - who thereafter should be free to pursue their tasks. Copyright 2007 die Autoren Journal compilation 2007, Verein für Socialpolitik und Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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Volume (Year): 8 (2007)
Issue (Month): 3 (08)
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References listed on IDEAS
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