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A cross country analysis of electricity market reforms: potential contribution of New Institutional Economics

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  • Erdogdu, E.

Abstract

The paper explores whether the question of why some countries are able to implement more extensive reforms is closely related to the question of why some countries have better institutions than others. We analyse this question by using an empirical econometric model based on Poisson regression with cross-section data covering 51 US states, 13 Canada states and 51 other countries. The results show that both the background of the chairperson of electricity market regulatory agency when reforms started and the minister/governor at that time and institutional endowments of a country are important determinants of how far reforms have gone in a country. Our results also suggest that any improvement in the investment environment contributes to the scope of reforms. On the other hand, there seems to be a negative relationship between reform progress and civil liberties, which may prove that reforms may be limited in democratic countries with strong civil society institutions such as trade unions or other organized structures in the society that may consider reforms as ‘harmful’ to their self-interest.

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  • Erdogdu, E., 2012. "A cross country analysis of electricity market reforms: potential contribution of New Institutional Economics," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1232, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  • Handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:1232
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    Cited by:

    1. Nepal, Rabindra & Menezes, Flavio & Jamasb, Tooraj, 2014. "Network regulation and regulatory institutional reform: Revisiting the case of Australia," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 259-268.
    2. Iweta Opolska, 2016. "Liberalisation of the gas industry in Europe.Does the European Union support efficacious regulatory solutions?," Ekonomia journal, Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw, vol. 44.
    3. Erdogdu, Erkan, 2016. "Asymmetric volatility in European day-ahead power markets: A comparative microeconomic analysis," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 398-409.
    4. Antonio Estache & Stéphane Saussier, 2014. "Public-Private Partnerships and Efficiency: A Short Assessment," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 12(3), pages 08-13, October.
    5. repec:eco:journ2:2017-03-02 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. repec:ces:ifodic:v:12:y:2014:i:3:p:19126463 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Electricity market reform; new institutional economics; Poisson regression;

    JEL classification:

    • E02 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - Institutions and the Macroeconomy
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements

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