Institutional framework and economic development: international evidence
This paper examines the effect of 'quality' of the institutional framework on economic development. Our empirical results support the hypothesis that 'good' institutions improve efficiency and accelerate growth. The positive effect of institutional 'quality' is more pronounced with mutually reinforcing support of economic freedom. Our results also indicate that 'good' institutions help developing countries grow faster to achieve conditional convergence. We infer from the results that economic development requires not only physical and human capital formation, but also freedom to choose and institutional support.
Volume (Year): 35 (2003)
Issue (Month): 17 ()
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