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Property rights protection and corporate R&D: Evidence from China

Listed author(s):
  • Lin, Chen
  • Lin, Ping
  • Song, Frank

Following the recent literature on institutions and economic growth, we examine the effects of property rights protection on corporate R&D. Using a unique 2003 World Bank survey of over 2400 firms in 18 Chinese cities, we obtain the following findings: (1) property rights protection is positively and significantly related to corporate R&D activity (for both process and product R&D); (2) government services and helping hand are conducive to corporate R&D, while informal payments to government officials are not; and (3) government ownership of firms and direct appointment of CEOs are negatively associated with corporate R&D activities. We also find that corporate R&D is positively related to firm size, and access to finance, but negatively related to product market competition and firm age.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Development Economics.

Volume (Year): 93 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (September)
Pages: 49-62

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Handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:93:y:2010:i:1:p:49-62
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/devec

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