IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/corfin/v21y2013icp136-152.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Cost of government and firm value

Author

Listed:
  • Firth, Michael
  • Gong, Stephen X.
  • Shan, Liwei

Abstract

Do high expenditures incurred in running the government benefit or hurt firms? Using Chinese data between 1999 and 2006, we find that higher administrative expenditures in provincial governments are associated with lower firm value, lower stock and financial performance, and lower labor productivity. Local governments that spend more on public administration tend to collect more fees from companies and spend less on social welfare and infrastructures. Our evidence is consistent with the “grabbing hand” hypothesis and has important policy implications.

Suggested Citation

  • Firth, Michael & Gong, Stephen X. & Shan, Liwei, 2013. "Cost of government and firm value," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 21(C), pages 136-152.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:21:y:2013:i:c:p:136-152
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2013.01.008
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0929119913000096
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jan K. Brueckner & David Neumark, 2014. "Beaches, Sunshine, and Public Sector Pay: Theory and Evidence on Amenities and Rent Extraction by Government Workers," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 6(2), pages 198-230, May.
    2. Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64, pages 416-416.
    3. Choy, HiuLam & Gul, Ferdinand A. & Yao, Jun, 2011. "Does political economy reduce agency costs? Some evidence from dividend policies around the world," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 16-35, January.
    4. Lixin Colin Xu, 2011. "The Effects of Business Environments on Development: Surveying New Firm-level Evidence," World Bank Research Observer, World Bank Group, vol. 26(2), pages 310-340, August.
    5. Frye, Timothy & Shleifer, Andrei, 1997. "The Invisible Hand and the Grabbing Hand," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 354-358, May.
    6. Yuanzheng Cao & Yingyi Qian & Barry R. Weingast, 1999. "From federalism, Chinese style to privatization, Chinese style," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 7(1), pages 103-131, March.
    7. JonasD.M. Fisher & Ryan Peters, 2010. "Using Stock Returns to Identify Government Spending Shocks," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 120(544), pages 414-436, May.
    8. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Cristian Pop-Eleches & Andrei Shleifer, 2004. "Judicial Checks and Balances," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(2), pages 445-470, April.
    9. Oates, Wallace E, 1973. "The Effects of Property Taxes and Local Public Spending on Property Values: A Reply and Yet Further Results," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(4), pages 1004-1008, July-Aug..
    10. Simon Johnson & John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, 2002. "Property Rights and Finance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1335-1356, December.
    11. Roger H. Gordon & Wei Li, 2012. "Provincial and Local Governments in China: Fiscal Institutions and Government Behavior," NBER Chapters,in: Capitalizing China, pages 337-369 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Lin, Chen & Lin, Ping & Song, Frank, 2010. "Property rights protection and corporate R&D: Evidence from China," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 49-62, September.
    13. Fan, Joseph P.H. & Wong, T.J. & Zhang, Tianyu, 2007. "Politically connected CEOs, corporate governance, and Post-IPO performance of China's newly partially privatized firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 330-357, May.
    14. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. " A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-783, June.
    15. Stijn Claessens & Luc Laeven, 2003. "Financial Development, Property Rights, and Growth," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(6), pages 2401-2436, December.
    16. Li, Hongbin & Meng, Lingsheng & Wang, Qian & Zhou, Li-An, 2008. "Political connections, financing and firm performance: Evidence from Chinese private firms," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(2), pages 283-299, October.
    17. Cull, Robert & Xu, Lixin Colin, 2005. "Institutions, ownership, and finance: the determinants of profit reinvestment among Chinese firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 117-146, July.
    18. Lin, Chen & Su, Dongwei, 2008. "Industrial diversification, partial privatization and firm valuation: Evidence from publicly listed firms in China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 405-417, September.
    19. Shan, Liwei & Gong, Stephen X., 2012. "Investor sentiment and stock returns: Wenchuan Earthquake," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 36-47.
    20. Edward L. Glaeser, 2012. "Urban Public Finance," NBER Working Papers 18244, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    21. Allen, Franklin & Qian, Jun & Qian, Meijun, 2005. "Law, finance, and economic growth in China," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 57-116, July.
    22. Hellman, Joel S. & Jones, Geraint & Kaufmann, Daniel, 2003. "Seize the state, seize the day: state capture and influence in transition economies," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 751-773, December.
    23. Lauren Cohen & Joshua D. Coval & Christopher Malloy, 2010. "Do Powerful Politicians Cause Corporate Downsizing?," NBER Working Papers 15839, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    24. Sam Peltzman, 1992. "Voters as Fiscal Conservatives," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 107(2), pages 327-361.
    25. repec:hrv:faseco:30728046 is not listed on IDEAS
    26. Nancy Huyghebaert & Qi Quan, 2011. "Ownership Dynamics after Partial Privatization: Evidence from China," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(2), pages 389-429.
    27. Fama, Eugene F. & French, Kenneth R., 1993. "Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 3-56, February.
    28. Chen, Gongmeng & Firth, Michael & Xu, Liping, 2009. "Does the type of ownership control matter? Evidence from China's listed companies," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 171-181, January.
    29. Alwyn Young, 2000. "The Razor's Edge: Distortions and Incremental Reform in the People's Republic of China," NBER Working Papers 7828, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    30. An, Zhiyong, 2012. "Taxation and capital structure: Empirical evidence from a quasi-experiment in China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 683-689.
    31. Mitchell A. Petersen, 2009. "Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets: Comparing Approaches," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(1), pages 435-480, January.
    32. Raymond Fisman & Shang-Jin Wei, 2004. "Tax Rates and Tax Evasion: Evidence from "Missing Imports" in China," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(2), pages 471-500, April.
    33. M. Max Croce & Howard Kung & Thien T. Nguyen & Lukas Schmid, 2012. "Fiscal Policies and Asset Prices," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 25(9), pages 2635-2672.
    34. repec:hrv:faseco:30724330 is not listed on IDEAS
    35. Bai, Chong-En & Liu, Qiao & Lu, Joe & Song, Frank M. & Zhang, Junxi, 2004. "Corporate governance and market valuation in China," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 599-616, December.
    36. Belo, Frederico & Gala, Vito D. & Li, Jun, 2013. "Government spending, political cycles, and the cross section of stock returns," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 305-324.
    37. Xin-Qiao Ping & Jie Bai, 2005. "Fiscal Decentralisation and Local Public Good Provision in China," Finance Working Papers 22027, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
    38. Hongbin Cai & Qiao Liu, 2009. "Competition and Corporate Tax Avoidance: Evidence from Chinese Industrial Firms," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(537), pages 764-795, April.
    39. Jin, Hehui & Qian, Yingyi & Weingast, Barry R., 2005. "Regional decentralization and fiscal incentives: Federalism, Chinese style," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1719-1742, September.
    40. Jean-Jacques Dethier & Maximilian Hirn & Stéphane Straub, 2011. "Explaining Enterprise Performance in Developing Countries with Business Climate Survey Data," World Bank Research Observer, World Bank Group, vol. 26(2), pages 258-309, August.
    41. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2011. "Rethinking Development Economics," World Bank Research Observer, World Bank Group, vol. 26(2), pages 230-236, August.
    42. Yan-Leung Cheung & P. Raghavendra Rau & Aris Stouraitis, 2010. "Helping Hand or Grabbing Hand? Central vs. Local Government Shareholders in Chinese Listed Firms," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 14(4), pages 669-694.
    43. Carhart, Mark M, 1997. " On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(1), pages 57-82, March.
    44. Mara Faccio, 2006. "Politically Connected Firms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 369-386, March.
    45. Michael Firth & Oliver M. Rui & Wenfeng Wu, 2011. "The Effects of Political Connections and State Ownership on Corporate Litigation in China," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(3), pages 573-607.
    46. Chen, Gongmeng & Firth, Michael & Gao, Daniel N. & Rui, Oliver M., 2006. "Ownership structure, corporate governance, and fraud: Evidence from China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 424-448, June.
    47. Fisman, Raymond & Svensson, Jakob, 2007. "Are corruption and taxation really harmful to growth? Firm level evidence," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(1), pages 63-75, May.
    48. Michael J. Cooper & Huseyin Gulen & Alexei V. Ovtchinnikov, 2010. "Corporate Political Contributions and Stock Returns," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 65(2), pages 687-724, April.
    49. Marco Pagano & Paolo F. Volpin, 2005. "The Political Economy of Corporate Governance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1005-1030, September.
    50. Freeman, Richard B, 1986. "Unionism Comes to the Public Sector," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 24(1), pages 41-86, March.
    51. Hongbin Cai & Hanming Fang & Lixin Colin Xu, 2011. "Eat, Drink, Firms, Government: An Investigation of Corruption from the Entertainment and Travel Costs of Chinese Firms," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(1), pages 55-78.
    52. Dischinger, Matthias & Riedel, Nadine, 2011. "Corporate taxes and the location of intangible assets within multinational firms," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7), pages 691-707.
    53. Chen, Gongmeng & Firth, Michael & Xin, Yu & Xu, Liping, 2008. "Control Transfers, Privatization, and Corporate Performance: Efficiency Gains in China's Listed Companies," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 43(01), pages 161-190, March.
    54. Olivier Blanchard & Roberto Perotti, 2002. "An Empirical Characterization of the Dynamic Effects of Changes in Government Spending and Taxes on Output," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 117(4), pages 1329-1368.
    55. Wilson, John Douglas, 1999. "Theories of Tax Competition," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 52(2), pages 269-304, June.
    56. Alzahrani, Mohammed & Lasfer, Meziane, 2012. "Investor protection, taxation, and dividends," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 745-762.
    57. Oates, Wallace E, 1969. "The Effects of Property Taxes and Local Public Spending on Property Values: An Empirical Study of Tax Capitalization and the Tiebout Hypothesis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 77(6), pages 957-971, Nov./Dec..
    58. Shuanglin Lin, 2005. "Excessive Government Fee Collection in China," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 23(1), pages 91-106, January.
    59. Boycko, Maxim & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1997. "Privatizing Russia," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262522284, March.
    60. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1994. "Politicians and Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 109(4), pages 995-1025.
    61. Firth, Michael & Malatesta, Paul H. & Xin, Qingquan & Xu, Liping, 2012. "Corporate investment, government control, and financing channels: Evidence from China's Listed Companies," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 433-450.
    62. Pranab Bardhan & Dilip Mookherjee, 2006. "Decentralisation and Accountability in Infrastructure Delivery in Developing Countries," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(508), pages 101-127, January.
    63. repec:hrv:faseco:30725664 is not listed on IDEAS
    64. Epple, Dennis & Zelenitz, Allan & Visscher, Michael, 1978. "A Search for Testable Implications of the Tiebout Hypothesis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 86(3), pages 405-425, June.
    65. Cheryl Xiaoning Long, 2010. "Does the Rights Hypothesis Apply to China?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(4), pages 629-650.
    66. Wilson, John Douglas, 1999. "Theories of Tax Competition," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 52(n. 2), pages 269-304, June.
    67. Alwyn Young, 2000. "The Razor's Edge: Distortions and Incremental Reform in the People's Republic of China," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 115(4), pages 1091-1135.
    68. Sun, Qian & Tong, Wilson H.S. & Yan, Yuxing, 2009. "Market liberalization within a country," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 18-41, January.
    69. Lo, Agnes W.Y. & Wong, Raymond M.K. & Firth, Michael, 2010. "Can corporate governance deter management from manipulating earnings? Evidence from related-party sales transactions in China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 225-235, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Bhimani, Alnoor & Dai, Narisa Tianjing & Sivabalan, Prabhu & Tang, Guliang, 2017. "How do enterprises respond to a managerial accounting performance measure mandated by the state?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 83687, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    2. Chen, Deqiu & Li, Sifei & Xiao, Jason Zezhong & Zou, Hong, 2014. "The effect of government quality on corporate cash holdings," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 384-400.
    3. Teng Lin & Marion Hutchinson & Majella Percy, 2015. "Earnings management and the role of the audit committee: an investigation of the influence of cross-listing and government officials on the audit committee," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 19(1), pages 197-227, February.
    4. Wang, Yizhong & Wei, Yueling & Song, Frank M., 2017. "Uncertainty and corporate R&D investment: Evidence from Chinese listed firms," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 176-200.
    5. repec:eee:intman:v:23:y:2017:i:3:p:292-305 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Zhu, Jigao & Ye, Kangtao & Tucker, Jennifer Wu & Chan, Kam (Johnny) C., 2016. "Board hierarchy, independent directors, and firm value: Evidence from China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 262-279.
    7. Chen, Yibiao & Wang, Steven Shuye & Li, Wei & Sun, Qian & Tong, Wilson H.S., 2015. "Institutional environment, firm ownership, and IPO first-day returns: Evidence from China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 150-168.
    8. repec:taf:jocebs:v:15:y:2017:i:4:p:373-406 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cost of government; Firm value; Efficiency; Productivity; Grabbing hand; Political economy;

    JEL classification:

    • H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
    • H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General
    • H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:21:y:2013:i:c:p:136-152. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jcorpfin .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.