Do Eurozone Countries Cheat with Their Budget Deficit Forecasts?
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Tilman Brück & Andreas Stephan, 2006. "Do Eurozone Countries Cheat with their Budget Deficit Forecasts?," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(1), pages 3-15, February.
- Stephan, Andreas & Brück, Tilman, 2005. "Do Eurozone Countries Cheat with their Budget Deficit Forecasts?," Working Paper Series 2005,5, European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), The Postgraduate Research Programme Capital Markets and Finance in the Enlarged Europe.
References listed on IDEAS
- Marco Buti & Paul van den Noord, 2004. "Fiscal policy in EMU: Rules, discretion and political incentives," European Economy - Economic Papers 2008 - 2015 206, Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission.
- von Hagen, Jürgen, 2003. "Fiscal discipline and growth in Euroland: Experiences with the stability and growth pact," ZEI Working Papers B 06-2003, University of Bonn, ZEI - Center for European Integration Studies.
- Strauch, Rolf & Hallerberg, Mark & von Hagen, Jürgen, 2004.
"Budgetary forecasts in Europe - the track record of stability and convergence programmes,"
Working Paper Series
307, European Central Bank.
- Rolf Strauch & Mark Hallerberg & Jürgen von Hagen, 2004. "Budgetary Forecasts in Europe – The Track Record of Stability and Convergence Programmes," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2004/42, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
- Andrikopoulos, Andreas & Loizides, Ioannis & Prodromidis, Kyprianos, 2004. "Fiscal policy and political business cycles in the EU," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 125-152, March.
- Alberto Alesina & Nouriel Roubini & Gerald D. Cohen, 1997. "Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262510944, February.
- Beetsma, Roel & Jensen, Henrik, 2003. "Contingent deficit sanctions and moral hazard with a stability pact," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 187-208, October.
More about this item
KeywordsFiscal policy; Budget deficit; Forecast error; Electoral cycles;
- H62 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Deficit; Surplus
- H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods
- C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
- C53 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Forecasting and Prediction Models; Simulation Methods
- E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp508. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Bibliothek). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/diwbede.html .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.