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Constitutional rules and competitive politics: their effects on secessionism

Author

Listed:
  • Albert Breton

    (Department of Economics - University of Toronto)

  • Pierre Salmon

    () (LEG - Laboratoire d'Economie et de Gestion - UB - Université de Bourgogne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

Albert Breton and Pierre Salmon argue that the effects of constitutional rules depend on the nature of political competition and on some meta-rules that contain procedures regulating the application and the modification of constitutional rules. They outline two models of competition - electoral competition and compound government competition - and describe the nature of the transactions between the parties involved in the two corresponding settings. In both, the transactions are over constitutional rules and ordinary goods and services, all of which are arguments in the utility functions of citizens. To make the discussion more concrete, the paper focuses on the demand for political autonomy, a variable which, at the limit, becomes a demand for secession and independence. This allows the specification of some meta-rules applicable to secessionism. In this particular context, it appears that relatively small differences in the content of the meta-rules lead to large differences in equilibrium outcomes.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Albert Breton & Pierre Salmon, 2003. "Constitutional rules and competitive politics: their effects on secessionism," Post-Print hal-00445598, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00445598
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00445598
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alberto Alesina & Enrico Spolaore, 1997. "On the Number and Size of Nations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1027-1056.
    2. Gordon Tullock, 1998. "on voting," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1348.
    3. Bolton, Patrick & Roland, Gerard & Spolaore, Enrico, 1996. "Economic theories of the break-up and integration of nations," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 697-705, April.
    4. Dan Usher, 1994. "The Significance of the Probabilistic Voting Theorem," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 27(2), pages 433-445, May.
    5. Grégoire ROTA GRAZIOSI, 2001. "Une analyse économique de la sécession," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2001034, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    6. Galeotti, Gianluigi & Breton, Albert, 1986. "An Economic Theory of Political Parties," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(1), pages 47-65.
    7. Pierre Salmon, 1999. "Ordinary elections and constitutional arrangements
      [Elections ordinaires et aménagements constitutionnels]
      ," Working Papers hal-01526528, HAL.
    8. Gebhard Kirchgässner, 2000. "Probabilistic Voting and Equilibrium: An Impossibility Result," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(1), pages 35-48, April.
    9. Breton,Albert, 1996. "Competitive Governments," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521481021.
    10. Bordignon, Massimo & Brusco, Sandro, 2001. "Optimal secession rules," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(10), pages 1811-1834, December.
    11. Kelvin J. Lancaster, 1966. "A New Approach to Consumer Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 74, pages 132-132.
    12. Pierre Salmon, 2001. "Constitutional Implications of Electoral Assumptions," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 333-349, December.
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