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Une analyse économique de la sécession

Author

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  • Grégoire ROTA GRAZIOSI

    (Faculté de Droit et Sciences Economiques, Université de Franche-Comté)

Abstract

Cet article propose une analyse économique de la sécession. Il s'inspire des travaux d'Alesina et Spolaore (1997), de Berkowitz (1997) et de Bolton et Roland (1997). Le raisonnement mené au niveau des Etats est largement transférable aux collectivités locales (régions, villes,...). Le recours à une représentation spatiale de la population nous permet d'appréhender l'hétérogénéité des préférences individuelles en matière de bien public. Le pays est supposé divisé en deux régions. La décision de sécession résulte d'un arbitrage individuel entre pression fiscale et localisation du bien public local, cet arbitrage évoluant selon la taille et le découpage régional du pays. En l'absence de disparités de revenus, nous montrons que le centre, la plus grande des deux régions, est davantage enclin à l'indépendance. Une approche normative, en terme de surplus, conclut notre analyse en appréciant l'efficacité économique du processus démocratique. Il apparaît alors que toute sécession unilatérale réduit le bien-être des deux régions.

Suggested Citation

  • Grégoire ROTA GRAZIOSI, 2001. "Une analyse économique de la sécession," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2001034, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
  • Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvre:2001034
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    File URL: http://sites.uclouvain.be/econ/DP/REL/2001034.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Berkowitz, Daniel, 1997. "Regional income and secession: Center-periphery relations in emerging market economies," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 17-45, February.
    2. Bolton, Patrick & Roland, Gerard & Spolaore, Enrico, 1996. "Economic theories of the break-up and integration of nations," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 697-705, April.
    3. Hochman, Oded & Pines, David & Thisse, Jacques-Francois, 1995. "On the Optimal Structure of Local Governments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1224-1240, December.
    4. DREZE , Jacques H., 1993. "Regions of Europe : A Feasible Status, to be discussed," CORE Discussion Papers 1993037, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    5. Bordignon, Massimo & Brusco, Sandro, 2001. "Optimal secession rules," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(10), pages 1811-1834, December.
    6. Feinstein, Jonathan S, 1992. "Public-Good Provision and Political Stability in Europe," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(2), pages 323-329, May.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Grégoire Rota Graziosi, 2004. "La fragmentation politique, une revue de la littérature," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 18(4), pages 193-223.
    2. BRETON, Albert & SALMON, Pierre, 2002. "Constitutional rules and competitive politics : their effects on secessionism," LATEC - Document de travail - Economie (1991-2003) 2002-06, LATEC, Laboratoire d'Analyse et des Techniques EConomiques, CNRS UMR 5118, Université de Bourgogne.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bien public; référendum; sécession; union;

    JEL classification:

    • D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations

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