Une analyse économique de la sécession
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Grégoire Rota Graziosi, 2004.
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LATEC - Document de travail - Economie (1991-2003)
2002-06, LATEC, Laboratoire d'Analyse et des Techniques EConomiques, CNRS UMR 5118, Université de Bourgogne.
- Albert Breton & Pierre Salmon, 2003. "Constitutional rules and competitive politics: their effects on secessionism," Post-Print hal-00445598, HAL.
More about this item
KeywordsBien public; référendum; sécession; union;
- D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
- H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
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