The Significance of the Probabilistic Voting Theorem
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- Dan Usher, 1994. "The Significance of the Probabilistic Voting Theorem," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 27(2), pages 433-445, May.
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- BRETON, Albert & SALMON, Pierre, 2002.
"Constitutional rules and competitive politics : their effects on secessionism,"
LATEC - Document de travail - Economie (1991-2003)
2002-06, LATEC, Laboratoire d'Analyse et des Techniques EConomiques, CNRS UMR 5118, Université de Bourgogne.
- Albert Breton & Pierre Salmon, 2003. "Constitutional rules and competitive politics: their effects on secessionism," Post-Print hal-00445598, HAL.
- Gebhard Kirchgässner, 2000.
"Probabilistic Voting and Equilibrium: An Impossibility Result,"
Springer, vol. 103(1), pages 35-48, April.
- Kirchgassner, Gebhard, 2000. "Probabilistic Voting and Equilibrium: An Impossibility Result," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(1-2), pages 35-48, April.
- Dan Usher, 2010. "Three Papers on Bargaining," Working Papers 1239, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Dan Usher, 2012. "Bargaining and voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(3), pages 739-755, June.
- Winer, Stanley L. & Hettich, Walter, 1998. "What Is Missed If We Leave Out Collective Choice in the Analysis of Taxation," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 51(n. 2), pages 373-89, June.
- Stanley L. Winer & Walter Hettich, 2002. "The Political Economy of Taxation: Positive and Normative Analysis when Collective Choice Matters," Carleton Economic Papers 02-11, Carleton University, Department of Economics, revised 2004.
- George Warskett & Stanley Winer & Walter Hettich, 1998. "The Complexity of Tax Structure in Competitive Political Systems," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 5(2), pages 123-151, May.
- Winer, Stanley L. & Hettich, Walter, 1998. "What Is Missed if We Leave Out Collective Choice in the Analysis of Taxation," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 51(2), pages 373-389, June.
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